This matter is presently before the court on a motion by VRBO Holdings, Inc. (“Holdings”), specially appearing to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (the “Motion”). In the Motion, Holdings seeks dismissal of Count IV (negligence) and Count VIII (breach of implied warranty of habitability) of the First Amended Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”).[2] The plaintiff, Perla Garcia (“Garcia”), opposes. Following a hearing and after careful consideration of the Amended Complaint, the parties’ submissions, and the arguments of counsel, the Motion is ALLOWED.
BACKGROUND
This case presents the question whether Holdings, a holding company incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Washington, is subject to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts for injuries allegedly suffered by an individual at a Vrbo vacation rental located in
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[1] Matthew McDonald, Occupied, LLC, VRBO Holdings, Inc., and HomeAway.com, Inc.
[2] Holdings sought dismissal of the claims against it in the original Complaint. For reasons set forth below, however, the court treats the Motion as seeking dismissal of the claims against Holdings in the Amended Complaint.
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Salem.[3] On the present limited jurisdictional record, the court is constrained to answer the question in the negative.
I. Prior Procedure
On December 29, 2025, Garcia filed a Complaint against the defendants, Holdings, Occupied, LLC (“Occupied”), and Samantha and Matthew McDonald (collectively the “McDonalds”), asserting claims for negligence against all defendants, and claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability against all defendants except Occupied, in connection with an incident that occurred at 11 Beacon Street in Salem (the “Premises”), which was owned, operated, and/or otherwise under the control of the McDonalds. In her original Complaint, Garcia alleged Holdings “managed and operated a website where the Premises was listed as a vacation rental property.”
On April 23, 2026, Holdings filed the present motion to dismiss. Before the Motion was heard, however, Garcia filed a Motion to Amend Complaint seeking to add a separate corporate entity, HomeAway.com (“HomeAway”), as a named defendant to the action (Paper No. 15). In her motion, Garcia asserted that newly discovered information revealed that HomeAway manages and operates www.vrbo.com (the “Vrbo website”), where the Premises was listed as a vacation rental property.[4] This court allowed Garcia’s Motion to Amend Complaint on August 10, 2026. The next day, Garcia filed her Amended Complaint with the court.
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[3] The court refers to the premises at issue as the “Vrbo rental property” because the rental was booked through the website, vrbo.com; the term is not meant to connote ownership or control of the rental property by Holdings.
[4] At the hearing, counsel for Holdings explained the newly discovered evidence referenced in Garcia’s Motion to Amend Complaint was information it provided to Garcia that HomeAway managed and operated the Vrbo website, not Holdings. Counsel for Garcia did not contest that assertion.
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On August 18, 2026, this court conducted a non-evidentiary hearing on the Motion. Holdings did not seek leave to supplement the Motion to address the allegations in the Amended Complaint but elected to go forward with the hearing. In fact, Holdings relies on the Amended Complaint’s newly added factual allegation that HomeAway administered the Vrbo website in arguing for dismissal. The court therefore treats the Motion as seeking dismissal of the claims asserted against Holdings in the Amended Complaint and addresses the factual allegations in that pleading.
II. The Factual Allegations and Claims Against Holdings in the Amended Complaint
Garcia alleges that, on or about July 11, 2023, while vacationing at the Premises, she and her husband reported a visible crack in the bathroom ceiling to the McDonalds through Vrbo’s messaging feature. Garcia alleges Occupied was responsible for managing the Premises and temporarily covered the gap with a metal plate promising further repairs. Garcia further claims, unbeknownst to her, a construction crew was in the process of repairing the roof of the Premises. While the crew went about its work, she alleges, a portion of the ceiling collapsed on her as she was showering, causing her to suffer severe injuries.
The Amended Complaint asserts that at all relevant times, “HomeAway managed and operated the website www.vrbo.com where the Premises was listed as a vacation rental property[,]” while also asserting that Holdings managed and operated “a website” where the Premises was listed as a vacation rental property. The Amended Complaint further avers Garcia “was vacationing and residing at a VRBO rental location”, identified as the Premises, when she suffered the injuries.[5] Garcia contends Holdings negligently failed to inspect or investigate
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[5] It bears noting that nowhere in the Amended Complaint does Garcia affirmatively allege she rented the Premises through the Vrbo website. Instead, the Amended Complaint alleges Holdings and HomeAway operated and managed the “website where the Premises was listed as a vacation rental property”, and that
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whether the Premises was fit for safe use by renters and failed to take reasonable steps to ensure it was free from hazards and defective conditions. Garcia also claims Holdings breached the implied warranty of habitability by failing to have the bathroom ceiling maintained and repaired in a reasonably safe condition for foreseeable renter use.
DISCUSSION
Holdings moves to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Holdings asseverates, among other things, it is a foreign holding company that has no employees and no business operations anywhere. More specifically, Holdings declares by way of affidavit that it does not own, manage, maintain, inspect, supervise, operate, clean, use, repair, direct or control any property, including the Premises. Holdings could not and did not conduct business in Massachusetts, it argues, and therefore no cause of action could arise from a “nonexistent business transaction.” Holdings further argues HomeAway, not itself, manages and operates the Vrbo website.
Garcia opposes the Motion. She argues Massachusetts has personal jurisdiction over Holdings under the Commonwealth’s long-arm statute and the Federal Due Process Clause. Garcia asserts Holdings markets thousands of properties for rent in Massachusetts, “derives significant profit from promoting Massachusetts properties” through the fees it charges, and collects and remits state and local lodging and occupancy taxes. Garcia does not challenge, however, that HomeAway is the entity that manages and operates the Vrbo website. Nor does she contest that Holdings is a holding company with no employees in Massachusetts.
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she “was vacationing and residing at a VRBO rental location” at the Premises. Holdings, for its part, does not appear to contest that the Premises was listed on and/or rented through the Vrbo website. The court, therefore, resolves the ambiguity in favor of Garcia and finds, for purposes of this motion, Garcia rented the Premises through the Vrbo website.
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I. The Parties[6]
Garcia is a resident of San Antonio, Texas. The McDonalds are residents of Salem, Massachusetts. Holdings is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Seattle, Washington. HomeAway likewise is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of Seattle, Washington.[7]
II. The Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
To establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant such as Holdings, Garcia must make a prima facie showing of facts sufficient to satisfy: (1) the Massachusetts long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3; and (2) constitutional due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478 Mass. 324, 329-330 (2017) (inquiry into jurisdiction is twofold, and court must engage in statutory analysis prior to reaching due process). “‘[P]rima facie evidence . . . is evidence which, standing alone and unexplained, maintains the proposition and warrants the conclusion to support which it is introduced.’” Cepeda v. Kass, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 732, 738 (2004), quoting Thomes v. Meyer Store, Inc., 268 Mass. 587, 588 (1929). In determining whether the plaintiff has made this prima facie showing, “the court acts as a data collector, not as a fact finder.” Cepeda, 62 Mass. App. Ct. at 737-738. “The burden is one of production, not one of persuasion.” Id. at 738.
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[6] Occupied is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Wyoming with a principal place of business located in Middleton, Massachusetts, but its involvement in the case has no bearing on the present motion.
[7] The Amended Complaint describes Holdings and HomeAway as having a principal place of business in Austin, Texas. The description appears to be in error as Holdings has submitted an affidavit declaring its principal place of business is Seattle, Washington. Garcia does not contest this assertion. In any event, the difference is immaterial for the purposes of addressing this motion. Either way, Holdings is a corporation foreign to Massachusetts.
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The court takes “specific facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether or not disputed) and construe[s] them in the light most congenial to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.” Id., quoting Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass’n, 142 F. 3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). In analyzing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the court may properly consider affidavits, attachments, answers to interrogatories, and deposition testimony. Heins v. Wilhelm Loh Wetzler Optical Machinery GmbH & Co. KG, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 14, 15 (1988). A defendant challenging the assertion of jurisdiction over it may offer evidence, but proffers of the defendant “become part of the mix only to the extent that they are uncontradicted.” Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2007).
III. Jurisdictional Facts in the Record
Apart from the Amended Complaint, the jurisdictional record here consists of the following: an affidavit from Cristy L. Denton, the Legal Manager for Corporate Administration for Expedia, Inc., submitted by Holdings (the “Denton Affidavit”), and Exhibits A through E attached to Garcia’s Opposition to the Motion.
The Denton Affidavit avers the following:
Holdings is a Delaware company with its principal office and place of business in Seattle, Washington;
Holdings is a holding company, not an operating company;
Holdings has no employees, maintains no business records, and has no business operations;
Holdings does not own, manage, maintain, inspect, supervise, operate, clean, use, repair, direct or control any property, including the Premises;
Holdings does not maintain an office, address, or telephone number in Massachusetts and does not maintain a bank account or investment account in Massachusetts;
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Holdings does not have headquarters in Massachusetts and does not regard Massachusetts as its “home” state;
Holdings does not own, manage, operate or control www.vrbo.com or any other website relevant to the Premises; and
HomeAway.com, Inc. is the entity that operates the Vrbo website.
The Denton Affidavit references Denton’s “general knowledge of assets owned by, and the operations of, Expedia Group, Inc. (“Expedia Group”) and other subsidiaries of Expedia Group.” Other than the fleeting reference to the Expedia Group and “other subsidiaries of the Expedia Group”, the Denton Affidavit contains no description of the corporate relationships between the Expedia Group and Holdings, the Expedia Group and HomeAway, Holdings and HomeAway, and/or all three business entities.
The Exhibits attached to Garcia’s opposition are as follows:
Exhibit A. Screenshots from the Vrbo website showing 16,116 vacation rentals available in Massachusetts, including popular destinations such as Salem.
Exhibit B. A printout from the Vrbo website about pay-per-booking fees directed towards renters of properties. These booking fees include a 5% commission fee, which is based on the rental amount and any additional fees charged the traveler, and a refundable 3% processing fee based on the total amount paid by the guest.
Exhibit C. An article, dated April 28, 2025, titled “The Complete Massachusetts Airbnb Host Lodging Tax Guide: Airbnb Massachusetts Occupancy Tax Breakdown.” The article notes that, according to Vrbo’s tax guide, Vrbo collects and remits, among other things, the Massachusetts 5.7% state room occupancy tax and any local occupancy excise in effect.
Exhibit D. A printout from the Vrbo website showing Vrbo collects and remits taxes and lodging taxes in various states across the country, including Massachusetts.
Exhibit E. Content Guidelines from the Vrbo website, updated in February 2024, addressing, among other things, Vrbo’s moderation of traveler community reviews and the content posted about rental properties, wherein Vrbo reserves the right to reject or remove any review that does not meet its criteria.
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The majority of webpages from the Vrbo website attached to Garcia’s opposition depict the “Vrbo” logo. However, the last page of Exhibit E reads in fine print, “©2026 Vrbo, an Expedia Group company. All rights reserved. Vrbo and the Vrbo logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of HomeAway.com, Inc.” Aside from the reference on the Vrbo webpage that Vrbo is “an Expedia Group company,” Garcia’s production does not describe the business relations between the Expedia Group, Holdings, and/or HomeAway.
IV. Analysis
The court, as it must, addresses the long-arm statute first before turning to the constitutional question. SCVNGR, Inc., 478 Mass. at 330. “In contrast to the long-arm statutes of some States, the Massachusetts statute does not purport to extend jurisdiction as far as due process would allow.” Id. at 328. See Motus, LLC v. CarData Consultants Inc., 23 F.4th 115, 124 (1st Cir. 2022) (suggesting Massachusetts’ long-arm statute might impose more restrictive limits on exercise of personal jurisdiction than Constitution). The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) nevertheless has observed, “the two questions tend to converge.” Good Hope Industries, Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass 1, 6 (1979).
A. The Long-Arm Statute
Personal jurisdiction is gained over a nonresident defendant “when some basis for jurisdiction enumerated in the [long-arm] statute has been established.” Intech, Inc. v. Triple “C” Marine Salvage, Inc., 444 Mass. 122, 125 (2005). The Massachusetts long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, “sets out a list of specific instances in which a Massachusetts court may acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney General, 479 Mass. 312, 317 (2018), quoting Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 767
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(1994). In this case, Garcia contends jurisdiction over Holdings is proper under subsection (a) of the long-arm statute, which states that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person where a cause “arises from” the person’s “transacting any business in this commonwealth[.]” G.L. c. 223A, § 3(a).[8]
“To satisfy [subsection (a) of the long-arm statute] … ‘The facts must satisfy two requirements -- the defendant must have transacted business in Massachusetts, and the plaintiff’s claim must have arisen from the transaction of business by the defendant.’” von Schönau- Riedweg v. Rothschild Bank AG, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 471, 483 (2019), quoting Fern v. Immergut, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 579 (2002). The SJC “routinely [has] construed this clause broadly.” Doucet v. FCA US LLC, 492 Mass. 204, 207 (2023), citing Tatro, 416 Mass. at 767. See, e.g., Carlson Corp. v. University of Vermont, 380 Mass. 102, 105 (1980) (signing of contract in Massachusetts for work performed entirely in Vermont satisfied transacting business requirement of long-arm statute). “Although an isolated (and minor) transaction with a Massachusetts resident may be insufficient, generally the purposeful and successful solicitation of business from residents of the Commonwealth, by a defendant or its agent, will suffice to satisfy this requirement” Tatro, 416 Mass. at 767.
Here, Garcia directs this court to the exhibits attached to her brief. She argues that Holdings, through the Vrbo website, markets thousands of properties for short-term rentals in Massachusetts and that it collects “significant profit from promoting Massachusetts properties” through the imposition of various fees. Garcia also advances Vrbo’s collection and remission of Massachusetts occupancy and lodging taxes as another factor demonstrating Holdings’
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[8] The long-arm statute defines the term “person” to include a corporation, whether a citizen or domiciliary of the Commonwealth or not and whether organized under the laws of Massachusetts or not. G. L. c. 223A, § 1.
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purposeful business connection with this forum. At first blush, Garcia’s position seems compelling, but a careful examination of the jurisdictional record exposes fatal flaws in her arguments.
First and foremost, there is no dispute that HomeAway owns the “Vrbo” trademark and operates the Vrbo website. Thus, the sole factual assertion in the Amended Complaint regarding Holdings’ alleged operation and management of the Vrbo website is incorrect.
Second, and just as critical, Garcia offers no evidence that Holdings or HomeAway are in any way related entities. The jurisdictional record as a whole lacks any meaningful description or evidence of the corporate relationship between Holdings and/or HomeAway and/or the Expedia Group.[9] See OMV Assocs., L.P. v. Clearway Acquisition, Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 561, 570 (2012), quoting Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. Antaramian, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 79 (1994) (“disregard of the separate corporate entity is reserved for ‘rare particular situations to prevent gross inequity.’”) There is no basis in the record for this court to find that HomeAway is a subsidiary of Holdings or that Holdings exercises any control over HomeAway, nor does Garcia make any such allegation in her Amended Complaint. See Kleinerman v. Morse, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 819, 823 (1989), quoting Willis v. American Permac, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 118, 122 (D. Mass. 1982) (“Significant exercise of control by an out-of-State parent corporation over a subsidiary and significant intermingling of officers and directors between parent and subsidiary have served to establish jurisdiction in the State where the subsidiary is conducting its business operations”). Indeed, it is entirely unclear what Holdings’ function is, let alone what the relationship is between it and/or HomeAway and/or the Expedia Group.
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[9] Garcia did not file a motion for jurisdictional discovery.
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It bears repeating that Garcia’s prima facie burden is one of “production,” not “persuasion.” Cepeda, 62 Mass. App. Ct. at 738. To find Holdings subject to personal jurisdiction in this case, the court would have to credit unsupported allegations and make unsupported assumptions in Garcia’s favor. See A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016) (“On prima facie review, the plaintiffs’ burden is to proffer evidence ‘sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction’ without relying on unsupported allegations”). The court cannot simply equate Holdings with HomeAway for jurisdictional purposes without some factual support in the record. The same type of assumption would have to be made to credit Garcia’s argument that “Vrbo” collects and remits state and local occupancy taxes. The court cannot conclude on the record before it that Holdings performs these functions, or that it derives revenues, let alone substantial revenues, from Massachusetts without crediting conclusory allegations or making unsupported assumptions. See Ticketmaster- NY, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1994) (court does not credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences in making jurisdictional determination).
Finally, as mentioned above, the Amended Complaint fails to allege any action or conduct that Holdings itself has undertaken to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction. Garcia does not allege that she entered into a contract to rent the Premises with Holdings, and she has produced no evidence showing that Holdings had any control over the condition of the Premises or any involvement in the repairs made to it.[10] In fact, Garcia alleges the McDonalds “owned, operated, and/or were otherwise in control” of the Premises, and that Occupy managed the rental property.
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[10] Holdings did not move to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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Even viewing Garcia’s allegations in the light most favorable to her jurisdictional claim, the court is constrained to conclude on the limited record before it that Massachusetts lacks personal jurisdiction over Holdings under the long-arm statute. At bottom, Garcia has not produced any factual support for this court to conclude that Holdings did anything to subject itself to personal jurisdiction in this forum.
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejects Holdings’ blanket assertion that it is immune from suit simply because it is a holding company that “could not have and did not transact business in Massachusetts.” See Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, 1998 WL 1181992, at *6 (1998) (finding foreign holding company subject to personal jurisdiction under Massachusetts long arm statute).[11] Rather, the jurisdictional record in this specific case is insufficient for the court to conclude Garcia has satisfied her prima facie burden.
Having determined the record is insufficient to conclude Holdings transacted business in Massachusetts to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it under the long-arm statute, the court need not address the question whether Garcia has demonstrated that her claims arise from or relate to Holdings’ transaction of business in Massachusetts. In any event, even if Garcia had met her prima facie burden under the long-arm statute, the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Holdings in this case does not comport with due process. Cf. Rosenthal v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC, 101 F.4th 90, 95 (1st Cir. 2024) (court need not inquire into distinctions between reach of Massachusetts long-arm statute and that of Due Process where plaintiff has not satisfied constitutional minimum demanded by due process).
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[11] A Superior Court judge in Philip Morris noted, “Nothing in the long-arm statute creates or expands liability, and the assertion of jurisdiction over [the holding company] does not make [the holding company] liable for the acts of its subsidiaries. The court is merely deciding whether [the holding company] may be sued in this state for what it itself has allegedly done.” 1998 WL 1181992, at *6.
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B. Federal Due Process
There are two types of personal jurisdiction to consider when undertaking the constitutional analysis: general and specific. Cossaboon, 600 F.3d at 31. The court addresses each seriatim below.
1. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction applies when “a foreign corporation has affiliations with the forum state that are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render the defendant essentially at home
there.” Fletcher Fixed Income Alpha Fund, Ltd. v. Grant Thornton LLP, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 718, 721 (2016), quoting Daimler v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 118 (2014). “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place” (internal quotation marks omitted). Centurion Networking Serv. Partners, LLC v. Barker, 2018 WL 1972789 at *2 (D. Mass. 2018), quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. “The pragmatic examples of locales in which a defendant corporation is considered at home are its state of incorporation and the state that houses its principal place of business.” Kuan Chen v. United States Sports Acad., Inc., 956 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2020).
In the present case, Holdings’ state of incorporation is Delaware and its principal place of business is Seattle, Washington. Holdings has no employees, maintains no offices, and has no business operations in Massachusetts, nor does it own, manage, or control any properties in the Commonwealth. There is no factual basis upon which this court can conclude that Holdings conducts continuous and systematic business in Massachusetts such that it is essentially at home here for jurisdictional purposes.[12] The record simply does not support a finding of general
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[12] Garcia’s exhibits indicate that the Vrbo website solicits business not only in Massachusetts, but across the country and internationally. For example, Exhibit B indicates that no processing fee is charged for
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jurisdiction over Holdings. See Moura v. New Prime, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 87, 94 (D. Mass. 2018) (“except in a truly ‘exceptional’ case, a corporate defendant may be treated as ‘essentially at home’ only where it is incorporated or maintains its principal place of business” [quoting Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2016)]). Thus, the relevant inquiry in this case concerns the court’s ability to exercise specific jurisdiction over Holdings.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
“[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that [allegedly] establishes jurisdiction” (internal quotations omitted). Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). “The constitutional touchstone of the determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process remains whether the defendant established minimum contacts in the forum state” (citations omitted). Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 210, 217 (2010).
“The due process analysis entails three requirements. First, minimum contacts must arise from some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. . . . Second, the claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. . . . Third, the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (citations omitted). Id. Put more succinctly, Holdings must have minimum contacts with Massachusetts, Garcia’s claims must arise from or relate to those contacts, and personal jurisdiction over Holdings must be reasonable. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-476 (1985).
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properties located in Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, and Exhibit D appears to contain a partial list of fourteen states other than Massachusetts where Vrbo collects and remits taxes.
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A number of Federal courts have addressed whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over HomeAway and/or Holdings and/or the Expedia Group is constitutionally permissible in their respective districts. For example, two Federal district court cases out of the District of South Carolina have directly addressed whether the Expedia Group d/b/a Vrbo/HomeAway are subject to personal jurisdiction in that forum under the Due Process Clause. In the first case, Conrad v. Benson, the plaintiff brought negligence and premises liability claims against HomeAway after she allegedly tripped, fell, and sustained injuries at a rental property. 2020 WL 4754332 at *1 (D. S.C. 2020).[13] HomeAway moved to dismiss the case against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. A district judge concluded that the court did not have general or specific jurisdiction over HomeAway. Id. at *3. The judge found that “HomeAway neither targets South Carolina in particular nor leases properties directly to South Carolina residents, acting instead ‘as an online marketplace that enables third-party property owners and/or managers to list their properties and potential [renters] to search for and book those properties and engage in rental transactions directly with those property owners.’ … The fact HomeAway might be a ‘continuing platform’ whereby third parties, such as [the plaintiff and property owner], discuss rentals is, … irrelevant to the question of whether HomeAway purposefully directed electronic activity toward South Carolina with the intent of engaging in business[.]” Id. at *4 (emphasis original).[14]
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[13] The defendant in Conrad was named in error as “Expedia Group d/b/a Vrbo”. The plaintiff proposed that the correct name was “Expedia, Inc., d/b/a HomeAway, Inc. a/k/a Vrbo”, but the judge opted to refer to that defendant as “HomeAway.” 2020 WL 4754332 at *1 n.1 (D. S.C. 2020).
[14] It is worth observing that several Federal Circuit Courts have concluded the maintenance of a website alone does not subject the owner or operator to personal jurisdiction, even for civil claims related to the site. See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 401 (4th Cir. 2003). Instead, “something more is necessary ….” Cossaboon v. Maine Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2010). See Connoisseure Products Corp. v. Fresh Finest, LLC, 2025 WL 78660 at *3 (D. Mass.
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In the second case, a different Federal district judge in South Carolina had “no difficulty” finding that court lacked general or specific personal jurisdiction over HomeAway. In Whisonant v. Exclusive Properties, LLC, the court found that “HomeAway’s ‘case related contacts with South Carolina are too tenuous and too insubstantial to constitutionally permit the exercise of specific jurisdiction’ over HomeAway.” 2023 WL 12204481 at *6 (D. S.C. 2023), quoting Fidrych v. Marriott International, Inc., 952 F.3d 124, 143 (4th Cir. 2020).15 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that HomeAway did not manage any of the properties listed on the Vrbo website, it was not a party to any rental transaction, it did not own or manage any properties listed on any of its websites, and HomeAway did not determine the prices charged for rentals or make decisions regarding potential discounts given to renters. Id.
By contrast, a Federal district judge in the District of West Virginia recently concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over “VRBO Holdings” and HomeAway was constitutionally permissible because the defendants advertised West Virginia properties on “their website” and engaged in long-term business activities in West Virginia. Boyd v. Emerald Isle LLC, 2026 WL 2915063 at *4-5 (D. W. Va. 2026). In another case, a Federal judge in the Southern District of Alabama summarily denied HomeAway’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because HomeAway failed to address whether the court had jurisdiction under DelValle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265 (11th Cir. 2022), and because HomeAway
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2025) (noting several district courts in First Circuit “require ‘something more’ to show a defendant purposefully availed itself of doing business in the forum state through a nationally accessible website”); see also Media3 Tech., LLC v. CableSouth Media III, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 107, 112 (D. Mass. 2014) (without some limiting principle regarding purposeful availment “the simple fact that virtually every business now has a website would eviscerate the limits on personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants.”)
[15] The defendants in Whisonant were named as “Exclusive Properties, LLC, HomeAway.com, and Vrbo.com.”
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incorrectly suggested that the district court’s analysis in the case of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) was “inapplicable.” Fell v. Seyah Vacation Rentals, LLC, 2025 WL 2627422 at *2 (S.D. Ala. 2025).[16]
At least one state appellate court has found, albeit in a Rule 23 decision, that personal jurisdiction over the Expedia Group, Inc. and HomeAway was lacking. In Malevitis v. Expedia Group, Inc., the plaintiff sued the Expedia Group and HomeAway for various contract and tort claims in Illinois state court. 2021 WL 6067706 at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021). The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the defendants were not subject to general jurisdiction of Illinois courts because the defendants were not incorporated in and did not have principal places of business in Illinois, and because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate “that this is an ‘exceptional case’ where defendants’ contacts with Illinois are ‘so substantial’ as to render them at home in Illinois.” Id. at *3. The Court also ruled that the defendants were not subject to specific jurisdiction because their conduct lacked a substantial connection to Illinois. Id. at *4. The Court found that plaintiff’s use of the website was insufficient to establish jurisdiction where the plaintiff did not allege and the record did not show that the defendants targeted travelers from Illinois or directed any conduct toward Illinois specifically. Id.
If nothing else, the above cases reinforce the requirement that a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts in the forum state before an exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Federal Due Process Clause is deemed proper. Determining whether minimum contacts exist rises or falls on the jurisdictional record. Here, largely for the reasons addressed above in the court’s
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[16] Although HomeAway and “Vrbo Holdings, Inc.” jointly filed the motion to dismiss, Vrbo Holdings, Inc., was eliminated as a named defendant in the plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint. The decision does not indicate a reason for the amendment.
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discussion of the Massachusetts long-arm statute’s transaction-of-business prong, this court concludes Garcia has failed to make a prima facie showing that Holdings purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Massachusetts without making unsupported factual assumptions or crediting generalized allegations. The court therefore finds it lacks specific jurisdiction over Holdings under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[17]
ORDER
For the above-enunciated reasons, VRBO Holding, Inc.’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Paper No. 13) is ALLOWED. Count IV and Count VIII of the Amended
Complaint are hereby DISMISSED.
So Ordered,
/s/William F. Bloomer
William F. Bloomer
Justice of the Superior Court
Dated:
October 27, 2026
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[17] In light of the court’s ruling under the first prong of the jurisdictional due process analysis, the court need not address whether Garcia’s claims arise from Holdings’ minimum contacts with Massachusetts and whether personal jurisdiction over Holdings is reasonable. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472-476.