Parties: BETH ISRAEL DEACONESS MEDICAL CENTER, INC. / THE BRIGHAM AND WOMEN’S HOSPITAL, INC. / DANA-FARBER CANCER INSTITUTE, INC. / JOSLIN DIABETES CENTER, INC. / PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE / THE CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL CORPORATION Docket: 2384CV01373-BLS2 / 2384CV01376-BLS2 / 2384CV01379-BLS2 / 2384CV01381-BLS2 / 2384CV01382-BLS2 / 2384CV01385-BLS2 Dates: November 10, 2026 Present: Kenneth W. Salinger County: SUFFOLK
Keywords: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AFTER A BENCH TRIAL

The plaintiffs in this case – Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc.; The Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Inc. (“the Brigham”); Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Inc.; The Children’s Hospital Corporation; Joslin Diabetes Center, Inc.; and the President and Fellows of Harvard College, acting on behalf the Harvard Medical School and the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health – operate hospitals or medical educational institutions in the Longwood Medical Area of Boston (the “LMA”). The parties refer to the six plaintiffs as the “Hospitals,” even though Harvard does not own or operate its own hospital.

This lawsuit concerns the prices that the Hospitals must pay to obtain electricity from the Medical Area Total Energy Plant (the “Plant”), which is located in the LMA and produces electricity, steam, and chilled water for the Hospitals. What is relevant here is that each Hospital contracted to purchase electricity from MATEP LLC, the Plant’s operator. MATEP LLC is owned by MATEP LP, which in turn is owned and controlled by Longwood Energy Partners LLC through its ownership of MATEP LP’s general partner and its position as the sole limited partner of MATEP LP. The parties refer to the three defendants collectively as “MATEP.”

The Court previously found, in deciding cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, that MATEP LLC violated the parties’ contracts starting in January 2022 by increasing it prices for electricity to impose a “Reliability Adder” on top of market rates, purportedly to cover increases in MATEP’s cost to provide a reliable supply of electricity.

 

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The parties’ remaining claims were tried, by agreement, without a jury. Both sides seek a declaratory judgment as to whether, since January 2022, the Hospitals were entitled to continue paying rates based on the market price for alternative supplies of electricity, that are provided at comparable levels of service and reliability at least equal to what MATEP is contractually obligated to provide, or whether the Hospitals were instead required to start paying MATEP at the much higher rates established by Eversource’s general commercial tariff. In addition, MATEP seeks a declaratory judgment as to whether the Hospital are entitled to select any qualifying reference price when market rates apply. Finally, the Hospitals claim that MATEP engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices that violated G.L. c. 93A and MATEP LLC’s obligations under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The Court is not persuaded by the Hospitals’ argument that MATEP is collaterally estopped, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, from arguing that alternative supplies of electricity are not available in the market at comparable levels of service and reliability.

On the merits, however, MATEP’s assertion that it has been entitled to charge the higher Eversource rates for electricity since January 2022 fails; the Court rules in the Hospitals’ favor on all claims concerning the express terms of their Amended Utilities Contracts with MATEP LLC. The Hospitals’ claims that MATEP is liable under G.L. c. 93A, § 11, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for engaging in unfair or deceptive conduct also fail.

Based on the evidence presented at trial, as well as its prior decision regarding the Reliability Adder, the Court now finds and concludes as follows.

o The Hospitals are entitled to a declaratory judgment stating that:

(a) since January 2022, as before, comparable alternative supplies of electricity within the meaning of § 5(a)(ii)(A) of the parties’ Amended Utilities Contracts exist and remain available in the market; (b) the Hospitals were and are entitled to pay MATEP LLC an electricity rate equal to any reference price selected by the Hospitals for a comparable alternative supply of electricity within the meaning of § 5(a)(ii)(A) of the Amended Utilities Contracts; (c) the Reliability Adder charge for electricity that Defendants assessed starting in January 2022 violates the Amended Utilities Contracts between MATEP LLC and each of the Plaintiffs and is therefore invalid; and (d) the back charges that MATEP has assessed

 

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against the Hospitals based on the Eversource tariff rate going back to January 2022 are invalid and violate these contracts.

o The Hospitals are entitled to recoup the Reliability Adder payments that they made to MATEP LLC from January 2022 to May 2023, in stipulated amounts that total roughly $16 million, plus statutory interest running at 12 percent per year. They are not entitled to recover any additional amount under the claims for unjust enrichment.

o The Hospitals have not shown that MATEP engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices that caused the Hospitals to suffer a loss of money or property in violation of G.L. c. 93A, or that violated any duties under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Hospitals are therefore not entitled to collect anything on their claims under c. 93A or this implied covenant.

1. Factual Background. The Court makes the following findings of fact based on the parties’ stipulation of facts, the testimony and exhibits presented at trial, the Court’s evaluation of witness credibility, and reasonable inferences that the Court has drawn from the evidence. The Court will reserve some of its factual findings until it makes its rulings on the merits of the parties’ claims.

1.1. The Plant’s Origins. Before the Plant was constructed, the Hospitals purchased their electricity from the Boston Edison Company (“BECo”) at the rates set by BECo’s G-3 tariff for large commercial and industrial customers. BECo and other electric utilities operating in Massachusetts had monopolies with respect to electricity generation, supply, transmission, and local distribution within their service areas. BECo is now known as Eversource.

Harvard University built the Plant to provide an alternative source of electricity, steam, and chilled water to LMA institutions. Construction was completed in the early 1980s. Harvard owned the Plant through an entity called Medical Area Total Energy Plant, Inc. (“MATEP Inc.”), a Massachusetts corporation that was organized in 1976. Harvard financed the Plant using the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds issued through the Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities Authority (“HEFA”).

The Hospitals contracted with Harvard to purchase electricity from the Plant at a price equal to the BECO G-3 tariff rate. At that time the Plant used six diesel generators to produce electricity, steam, and chilled water.

 

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1.2. Electric Industry Restructuring. The Legislature enacted the Massachusetts Electric Industry Restructuring Act of 1997 to help foster competition in the markets to generate and supply electricity. It created incentives to separate, and had the effect of separating, ownership of the facilities used to generate and supply electricity from the facilities used for the transmission and local delivery of electricity. The Restructuring Act permits retail suppliers to act as intermediaries that can buy electricity from generators and sell it to retail customers, and arrange for it to be delivered through the wholesale electricity transmission grid run by the independent system operator known as ISO New England (“ISO-NE”).

Neither the generators nor the retail suppliers are permitted to deliver electricity directly to end-user customers. Instead, when a retail supplier purchases electricity from a generator on behalf of its customers, the generator delivers the electricity to ISO-NE’s grid, where it is pooled with electricity from other generators to supply the electricity demanded by all customers in this region. Local delivery lines connect the grid to end-user customers. ISO-NE is responsible for, among other things, procuring enough generation to meet total demand and for operating the electric grid.

In other words, in Massachusetts the business of physically generating electricity is kept separate by law from the business of the transmission and ultimate delivery of electricity. Generators of electricity are not permitted to and do not physically deliver electricity to an end user; instead they deliver electricity to the grid, which transmits the energy to the local delivery network.

Thus, although there is competition in the markets for generating and supplying electricity, in Massachusetts there is no competition for the delivery of electricity. Indeed, competition in delivering electricity is barred by law. That has been true ever since the Restructuring Act was enacted in 1997. By law the delivery of electricity is controlled by monopolies in each service area.

MATEP is unique in that it generates electricity but has a statutory exception that permits it to deliver that electricity directly to its hospital and non-profit educational institution customers.

1.3. The Restated Utilities Contracts. During 1997, as the Legislature was completing its work on the Restructuring Act, Harvard was exploring a potential sale of the Plant. The Hospitals had a contractual right to consent to, or withhold their consent from and thereby veto, any sale of the Plant by Harvard. In preparation for the sale, Harvard and the Hospitals negotiated and

 

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executed Restated Utilities Contracts (the “RUCs”) that included new pricing terms reflecting the changes wrought by the Restructuring Act. Though the RUCs provide that they were executed “as of” October 31, 1997, they were in fact executed in late Spring of 1998.

The Hospitals’ goal in negotiating the RUCs was to ensure that, when the Restructuring Act took effect, they would be able to pay the same price to obtain electricity from the Plant that they would be able to obtain in a newly competitive market for electricity generation and supply. Ultimately the Hospitals and Harvard agreed to contract terms that reflected that aim.

Harvard acknowledged in each RUC “that a reliable supply of the Users requirements for Utilities is critical to the User.” See RUC § 1(a). It contracted to “provide continuous delivery” of each Hospital’s requirements for electricity and other covered utilities at all times, and to “avoid non-delivery” of electricity and other covered utilities “at any time.” Id. Harvard contracted to deliver the agreed-upon supplies of electricity even if the Plant is not in service, for any reason, and the Plant had to obtain electricity from another source in order to meet the Hospitals’ needs. See RUC § 6(d)(iii) & § 9(d)(i).

Harvard agreed to provide electricity “on the basis of pricing comparable to pricing available in a competitive market for levels of service comparable to that required to be provided by Harvard pursuant to this Restated Utilities Contract, all as more specifically provided in this Restated Utilities Contract.” See RUC § 1(c).

The details for electricity pricing were set forth in Section 5(a). This section provided that Harvard had to charge rates equal to one of two different market benchmarks of rates that are actually paid by other customers.

One possible benchmark was to charge the rates established in “the applicable rate schedules actually in general use by customers of [Boston Edison Company] having demand and consumption characteristics similar to” the Hospital. See RUC § 5(a)(i). The “applicable rate schedule” was defined to be BECo’s G-3 tariff if that is still in effect, or the successor tariff that most closely approximates the G-3 tariff. Id. § 5(a)(ii). If this pricing benchmark applied, then each Hospital was obligated to pay Harvard the dollar amount that it “would have been required to pay” to BECo if the Hospital had obtained its electricity from BECo instead of from the Plant. Id. § 5(a)(i).

 

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The other pricing benchmark would instead take effect if “a competitive market arises in which alternative supplies of electricity at comparable levels of service with specifications and reliability standards at least equal” to those required in the RUC “are actually available … under firm (non-interruptible) agreements.” RUC § 5(a)(ii)(A). When that condition was met, Harvard could no longer charge the BECo rate but must instead had to charge “the price … of such alternative supplies” (emphasis added). Id. ¶ 5(a)(ii)(B). Comparable alternative supplies were deemed “actually available” if the Hospital “could contract for and obtain delivery of” such alternative supplies, in the absence of its contract with Harvard. Id. § 5(a)(ii)(A).

The purpose and intended effect of § 5(a)(ii)(A) was to provide each Hospital with the right to competitive market pricing once the Restructuring Act took effect and a competitive market developed for electricity generation and supply. In other words, this provision ensured that the Hospitals would benefit from any lowering of electricity prices in a deregulated, competitive market for generation and supply.

1.4. 1998 Sale of MATEP. In early 1998, Harvard made plans to sell the Plant to Advanced Energy Systems (AES), a subsidiary of NSTAR. As part of its planning for the anticipated sale, in January 1998 Harvard formed MATEP LLC, which became the legal entity that operated the Plant. MATEP Inc. continued to own the Plant and also owned MATEP LLC. When the sale to AES was consummated, it became the sole owner of MATEP Inc. and therefore the indirect owner of MATEP LLC.

During this same period, HEFA identified a competitive retail supplier of electricity, called PECO Energy Company, that agreed to sell electricity to interested HEFA members. In March 1998 PECO contracted with a subsidiary of HEFA to sell electricity to HEFA members through an arrangement that they called the PowerOptions program. The form of supply contract agreed to by PECO required it to supply “electric energy and capacity sufficient to provide firm, full requirements” of each contracting entity. These supply contracts provided that PECO would supply the electricity by arranging to transport it to the “Delivery Point” on the wholesale grid of the local distribution company responsible by law for delivering purchase electricity to each contracting institution. In other words, PECO was agreeing to procure and supply electricity but not to deliver it directly to its customers, as that was not permitted under Massachusetts law.

 

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As AES sought to convince the Hospitals to approve its proposed purchase of the Plant, the Hospitals pointed to the electricity supply contracts that PECO had agreed to offer to HEFA members. The Hospitals asked AES to agree that the PECO contracts satisfied the requirements of § 5(a)(ii) of the RUCs, and that therefore the PECO rates would become the reference price for electricity bought by the Hospitals from the Plant if AES was allowed to consummate the purchase and take over the RUCs from Harvard. The Hospitals took the position that if the PECO contracts did not satisfy the § 5(a)(ii) conditions, then no competitive supply option could ever do so and the Hospitals would not approve the sale.

AES accepted the Hospital’s demand and the sale of the Plant to AES was approved and closed. As part of its acquisition of the Plant, on June 1, 1998, AES caused MATEP LLC (acting through its sole member MATEP Inc.) to enter into letter agreements with each of the hospitals. In these letter agreements, MATEP LLC agreed that it would charge a new reference price equal to the rate charged by PECO through HEFA’s PowerOptions program, so long as PECO “commenced deliveries of electricity under a majority of the Two Year Agreements” between PECO and seven institutions listed in an exhibit no later than April 1, 1999. The Hospitals agreed to keep paying the BECo tariff rate until that date, but MATEP LLC agreed to hold in escrow all payments that exceeded the PECO rate and to refund that amount if this trigger condition were met.

Thereafter, MATEP LLC refused to repay the escrowed amounts, taking the position that the trigger had not been met. The Hospitals sued. Judge Van Gestel ruled in their favor in 2001. He found that by April 1, 1999, PECO had entered into Two Year Agreements with all seven of the listed institutions, had started to deliver electricity to six of these institutions by supplying electricity to them through the grid, and therefore had commenced deliveries of electricity under a majority of the Two Year Agreements. He therefore concluded that the Hospitals were entitled to recover their share of the escrowed payments.

1.5. Setting the Reference Price. For the next twenty years, MATEP LLC manifested its agreement that there continued to be a competitive market in which alternative supplies of electricity at comparable levels of service, within the meaning of § 5(a)(ii)(A) of the parties’ utility contracts, were actually available under firm agreements.

 

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From 2001 through 2021, MATEP LLC charged the Hospitals for electricity at rates that were either based on a reference rate selected by the Hospitals or at a rate obtained by MATEP and accepted by the Hospitals.

In July 2001, the Hospitals informed MATEP LLC that the new reference price would be based on new rates offered by Select Energy, Inc., to supply electricity to the Harvard Institutes of Medicine (“HIM”), for their facility located at       4 Blackfan Circle in the LMA, through March 2003. The Hospitals explained that this was an appropriate reference price because the HIM’s load characteristics were very similar the Hospitals’ load characteristics. The Hospital’s load factor, which is the difference between their peak load and their average load, is above 80 percent; this is unusually high compared to most other commercial electric users.

MATEP LLC accepted, charged, and collected those rates.

Starting in 2005, MATEP LLC and the Hospitals entered into a series of Memoranda of Understanding (“MOUs”) that established the reference prices for electricity for each year from January 2006 through December 2021. For the first MOU, MATEP LLC and the Hospitals agreed that the reference price would be based on the rate that SourceOne was able to obtain in the competitive market to purchase one megawatt of power for MATEP LLC. In most of the subsequent pricing MOUs, the Hospitals selected and MATEP LLC agreed to accept a reference price based on electric rates obtained by soliciting bids to supply electricity for 4 Blackfan Circle in the competitive market, by delivering that electricity to the grid.

1.6. 2010 Sale of MATEP. In June 2010, AES sold MATEP LLC (the Plant operator) and MATEP Inc. (the Plant owner) to a joint venture between Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners and Veolia Energy North America. As part of this transaction, MATEP LP became the indirect successor by merger to MATEP Inc. Under the new ownership, Veolia Energy Boston operated the Plant under a contract with MATEP LLC.

1.7. The Amended Utilities Contracts. In September 2015, MATEP LLC entered into Amended Utilities Contracts (the “AUCs”) with each of the Hospitals. The pricing and other provisions from the RUCs that are summarized above—including the pricing standard based on competitive market pricing set forth in § 5(a)(ii)(A) of the contract—were incorporated almost verbatim into the AUCs without any substantive change; the only revisions were that the references to “Harvard” were replaced by references to

 

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MATEP LLC, and the references to Boston Edison Company were replaced by references to its new trade name Eversource.

1.8. 2018 Sale of MATEP. In March 2018, Longwood Energy Partners LLC (“LEP”) acquired 100 percent of the ownership interests in MATEP LLC and MATEP LP, and thus took over ownership and operation of the Plant. LEP is indirectly owned by ENGIE North America Inc. (a wholly-owned subsidiary of ENGIE S.A., which is an electric utility company based in France) and AxInfra US L.P. (a subsidiary of Axium Infrastructure US Inc., which is an infrastructure investment firm that is owned by an entity based in Montreal, Canada). Since this change in ownership, ENGIE has operated the Plant on behalf of MATEP LLC.

The AUCs between MATEP LLC and the Hospitals were not changed when LEP acquired the Plant’s owner and operator. Though MATEP LLC has a new owner, its contractual obligations remain the same as they were before this transaction.

ENGIE and Axium understood when they purchased the Plant’s owner and operator that they were the AUCs did not guarantee they would recover any particular profit margin, and did not include any pricing mechanism to increase rates in order to cover higher than anticipated Plant operating or capital costs.

1.9. The Plant and the Hospitals’ Backup Electricity Supplies. Today the Plant is able to generate as much as 95 MW of electricity using a combination of three combustion turbine generators (or “CTGs,” which can operate by burning natural gas or no. 2 fuel oil), two steam turbine generators, and five remaining diesel generators. The CTGs were all installed after 1996.

MATEP has contracted to supply the Hospitals with a total of 62.8 MW of electricity. For MATEP, the grid effectively serves as its backup source of electricity. The capacity of the Plant’s diesel generators is not enough to replace one of the CTGs if it is not available.

To ensure that the grid can backstop the Plant, the Hospitals have their own direct connections to Eversource feeder lines that can supply electricity even if the Plant were to go down for some reason. For example, the Brigham connects its electrical switchgear both to MATEP feeder lines and to Eversource feeder lines.

 

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In addition, the Hospitals are legally required to and do in fact provide their own emergency backup power systems using diesel generators that are able to reestablish electrical power to essential systems within 10 seconds of a power outage, and to keep sufficient fuel on site to provide such backup power for at least 96 hours (i.e. four days). These backup generation facilities are owned and maintained by the Hospitals within their own facilities, separate and apart from the Plant.

1.10. 2021 Reliability Rider Request. In March 2021, after ENGIE and Axium acquired the Plant MATEP asked the Hospitals to agree—in a proposed MOU to determine the reference price for 2022—to require bidders to include an extra “reliability/firmness adder” charge in an unspecified amount. MATEP contended that this was required to make market rates comparable to the reliability standards set forth in the AUCs. The Hospitals disagreed.

In response, in April 2021 MATEP instead asked the Hospitals to include a “Reliability -Firmness Rider” in the 2022 bid solicitation for the 4 Blackfan Circle building. This proposed rider would define the “delivery point” as the meter at 4 Blackfan Circle. It would also require the supplier to provide the Hospitals with backup generation.

By redefining the “delivery point,” this proposed rider would have required any retail supplier that placed a bid to agree to do something that is not permitted under Massachusetts law—arrange for delivery of electricity directly to the customer, rather than to the ISO-NE grid. MATEP knew full well that this rider would operate as a poison pill that would prevent any competitive retail supplier from bidding on the contract, as confirmed in a subsequent email sent by MATEP’s CEO to ENGIE and Axium.

By adding a further requirement that the supplier provide a backup supply of electricity, the rider would impose something that made no economic sense and could not realistically be achieved. As discussed above, the Hospitals already provide their own emergency backup electricity generation capacity. Retail suppliers of electricity in Massachusetts are not in the business of establishing and providing backup generation capacity.

The Hospitals did not agree to the proposed Reliability-Firmness Rider. Instead, they arranged for 4 Blackfan Circle to solicit bids consistent with past practice, and identified the price terms of the winning bid as the reference price for 2022. The Hospitals did not lose any money or property as a result of MATEP’s request that they require retail supplies to agree to the terms of the

 

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Reliability-Firmness Rider if they wished to contract to supply electricity for  4 Blackfan Circle.

1.11. The Reliability Adder and Contract Renegotiation Talks. In January 2022, MATEP unilaterally announced that in addition to charging the reference price for electricity identified through the 4 Blackfan Circle solicitation, it was going to impose a surcharge that it called the “Reliability Adder” to cover higher than anticipated Plant operating and capital costs.

After the Hospitals disputed that surcharge, they initiated the dispute resolution process under the AUCs. That led to broader, high-level discussions with MATEP about negotiating a new contract with a different pricing scheme to replace the AUCs. These discussions took place in a series of meetings among Hospital and MATEP representatives that the parties called the Global Solutions Working Group.

MATEP was eager to revise the AUCs to share responsibility for capital investment needed to maintain and upgrade the Plant. Under the AUCs, MATEP bears full responsibility for those costs. It proposed a new contracting model under which the Hospitals would share responsibility for future capital investments.

Part of the context for these discussions was a new City of Boston ordinance, called the Building Emission Reduction and Disclosure Ordinance (“BERDO”), that would subject the Hospitals to penalties that could be in the magnitude of hundreds of millions of dollars if they did not comply with certain decarbonization requirements. Reducing the Plant’s carbon output, as one way to work to comply with the BERDO requirements, would require substantial new capital investment that was not anticipated in the AUCs. MATEP took the position the position that it could help the Hospitals achieve their carbon reduction goals only if the rates that the paid for utilities provided by the Plant were revised to cover the necessary capital investment. MATEP asked the Hospitals to pay $150 mean of the capital cost to decarbonize the Plant by converting it from steam to hot water.

MATEP also tried to convince the Hospitals to negotiate a new contract even if it did not address BERDO and decarbonization issues. MATEP proposed that the AUCs be replaced by a concession, or cost-plus, contract that would have eliminated MATEP’s financial risks under the AUCs. As part of its pitch for a new contract in 2023, MATEP presented a flawed analysis purporting to show that the proposed contract would save the Hospitals money, that inflated the

 

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projected costs for electricity under the AUCs by double-counting several components of permitted charges. In fact the proposed new contract would have cost the Hospitals much more than their expected future charges under the AUCs.

Ultimately, the Hospitals decided that they were not interested in paying for MATEP’s capital costs or exploring a new contract that would replace the AUCs with a concession model contract.

The Court held in March 2024 that the Reliability Adder is invalid under and violates the AUCs between MATEP LLC and each of the Hospitals. The Court explained that the fact “[t]hat MATEP is now unhappy with the deal that it struck, and fears it will lose money if MATEP cannot charge more than it bargained for, does not change the plain meaning of its contract terms.” As the Court noted, MATEP cannot escape the AUCs’ pricing requirements merely because “known risks” assumed by MATEP “turned out to [its] disadvantage.” Karaa v. Kuk Yim, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 718 (2014), quoting Baetjer v. New England Alcohol Co., 319 Mass. 592, 602 (1946).

In response, MATEP claimed for the first time that comparable alternative supplies of electricity had not been available on the market at any point after the end of 2021, asserted that the Hospitals were therefore obligated under the AUCs to start paying much the higher electricity rates that are available under the Eversource G-3 tariff, and back-billed the Hospitals at those rates back to January 2022.

2. Reliability Adder Claims. The Court’s decision in 2024 on the cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings resolved the Hospital’s claims in count I of their complaints for a declaratory judgment as to whether the Reliability Adder was allowed under the AUCs, and established that MATEP LLC is liable under count III for breach of contract by imposing and collecting Reliability Adder charges. This ruling also effectively mooted the Hospital’s claims in count V for unjust enrichment, as the Hospitals note in their post-trial request for findings that they asserted this claim solely in the alternative to their breach of contract claim in count III regarding the Reliability Adder. The parties have now stipulated the amounts that each of the Hospitals is entitled to recoup as a result, but disagree as to what rate should be used to calculate pre- or post- judgment interest.

 

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Based on the Court’s prior rulings and the parties’ stipulations, the Hospitals are entitled to recoup the total amount of Reliability Adder payments made by each of them, including interest assessed and collected by MATEP, as follows:

Institution

Reliability Adder Damages

Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc.

$3,698,795.28

The Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Inc.

$3.724,808.67

Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Inc.

$2,112,363.59

Joslin Diabetes Center, Inc.

$350,903.98

President and Fellows of Harvard College

$2,419,381.84

The Children’s Hospital Corporation

$3,759,141.46

By statute, each Hospital is also entitled to recover simple interest running at the rate of 12 percent per year. See G.L. c. 231, § 6C. This award of interest runs “from the date of the breach or demand” if that date has been established. Id. The parties stipulated that each Hospital made its Reliability Adder payments from January 2022 through May 2023. But the Hospitals did not establish exactly when each payment was made. So all we know is that the last payments were made in May 2023.

The Court will therefore order that each Hospital is entitled to collect statutory interest of 12 percent per year running from May 1, 2023. Cf. Striar v. American Medical Int’l, Inc., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 104–105 (1998) (under § 6C, burden is on plaintiffs to prove they are entitled to interest for periods prior to filing suit).

MATEP’s argument that AUCs limit the award to a much lower interest rate is without merit. Although the AUCs define a contractual “interest rate” as being equal to the “base rate” charged by Bank of America, N.A. plus one percent per year, that definition does not apply here. The statutory definition of interest rate applies only where a Hospital fails to make a timely payment under the AUC and therefore owes interest pursuant to ¶ 5(e). MATEP LLC points to no contractual provision that governs the interest that it must pay on the amounts that it collected and held onto in breach of its contractual obligations.

3. Remaining Contract Claims. For the reasons discussed in this section, the Court finds in the Hospitals’ favor as to the merits of the remaining claims regarding the express terms of the AUCs.

 

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3.1. MATEP Is Not Collaterally Estopped. The Court will reach the merits of those claims because it is not persuaded by the Hospitals’ arguments that

(i) during prior litigation between the parties Judge van Gestel decided, in 2001 and again in 2005, that the Hospitals are entitled to pay MATEP market rates for electricity because alternative supplies of electricity are available in a competitive market at comparable levels of service within the meaning of the AUCs, and (ii) MATEP is therefore collaterally estopped under the doctrine of issue preclusion from relitigating the issue.

In fact, in 2001 Judge van Gestel ruled only that a condition of the parties’ 1998 Letter Agreement was satisfied because PECO had commenced deliveries under a majority of its Two Year Agreements by April 1, 1999. He was not asked to and did not decide whether comparable supplies of electricity were actually available in the market. See Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. v. MATEP, LLC, Suffolk Sup. Ct. no. 994530-BLS, 2001 WL 1249796, at *3–*7 (Mass. Super. Mar. 20, 2021). Instead, the parties’ 1998 Letter Agreement assumed that the contractual comparability conditions would be met once PECO commenced deliveries under a majority of its contracts with HEFA members. Id. Since that underlying presumption was “a product of the parties’ consent,” it was not “actually litigated” and resolved in the 2001 decision. Compare Mullins v. Corcoran, 488 Mass. 275, 281–282 (2021) (“An issue has been ‘actually litigated’ if it ‘was subject to an adversary presentation and consequent judgment that was not a product of the parties’ consent.’ “) (quoting Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 531 (2002)).

In 2005, Judge van Gestel decided only that under the RUCs the reference price for electricity used in producing chilled water must be the same as the reference price for electricity that MATEP supplies to the Hospitals. See Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. v. MATEP, LLC, Suffolk Sup. Ct. no. 994530-BLS, 2005 WL 168408`, at *4 * *9–*15 (Mass. Super. June 16, 2025). Once again, he did not determine whether comparable supplies of electricity were available in the market.

The doctrine of issue preclusion “bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Alicea v. Commonwealth, 466 Mass. 228, 235 (2013), quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008), quoting in turn New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748-749 (2001).

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“A party is precluded from relitigating an issue where ‘(1) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; (2) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party (or in privity with a party) to the prior adjudication; and (3) the issue in the prior adjudication was identical to the issue in the current adjudication,’ was essential to the earlier judgment, and was actually litigated in the prior action.” Degiacomo v. City of Quincy, 476 Mass. 38, 42 (2016), quoting Tuper v. North Adams Ambulance Serv., Inc., 428 Mass. 132, 134 (1998). Thus, where an issue was not actually litigated, a prior court decision cannot have collateral estoppel effect as to that issue. See, e.g., Edgartown Federated Church v. Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 23, 30 (2020).

The 2001 and 2005 decisions by Judge van Gestel do not have issue preclusive effect with respect to whether comparable supplies of electricity were actually available in the market because the issue was not “actually litigated” and decided in that case, but instead was a background assumption shared by the parties and not challenged by MATEP LLC. See Town of Ware v. Town of Hardwick, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 332 (2006) (police officer not collaterally estopped under doctrine of issue preclusion from claiming causal connection between police job and disabling condition, where issue of causation was not actually litigated when same person previously applied for disability retirement from firefighter job because that employer did not oppose disability retirement application).

3.2. MATEP Must Continue to Charge Market Rates. Turning to the central dispute between the parties, the Court finds that competitive alternative supplies of electricity have been available on the market since 1998, including from January 2022 until the present, the Hospitals are therefore entitled to obtain electricity from MATEP LLC at rates equal to the price of such alternative supplies, and MATEP LLC has no contractual right to charge the Hospitals the much higher Eversource tariff rates for electricity.

MATEP LLC charged the Hospitals a market rate, based on the price of comparable alternative supplies of electricity, from 1998 until late 2024. Suddenly, in December 2024, MATEP took the position that the Hospitals were required to start paying the higher Eversource G-3 tariff rate both going forward and retroactively to January 2022.

The Court finds that MATEP LLC violated the terms of the parties’ contracts by seeking to disavow a course of dealing that spanned 26 years and asserting

 

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for the first time that alternative supplies of electricity at comparable levels of service were no longer available in the market.

3.2.1. Legal Background—Contract Interpretation. As with any contract concerning a business relationship, the Court must interpret the language of each AUC “in the context in which it was written and ‘with reference ... to the objects sought to be accomplished,’ mindful that ‘a contract should be construed … to give it effect as a rational business instrument and in a manner [that] will carry out the intent of the parties.” Homeowner's Rehab, Inc. v. Related Corporate V SLP, L.P., 479 Mass. 741, 751—752 (2018), quoting Starr v. Fordham, 420 Mass. 178, 192 (1995).

In doing so, the Court must be “guided by ‘justice, common sense, and the probable intent of the parties.’ ” Robbins v. Krock, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 134, 139 (2008), quoting Fried v. Fried, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (1977); accord, e.g., Krapf v. Krapf, 439 Mass. 97, 105 (2003); City of Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 717, 720 (1999). In other words, it must be mindful that “[b]usiness contracts must be construed with business sense as they naturally would be understood by intelligent persons of affairs, … and not according to forced and refined interpretations which are intelligible only to lawyers.” Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. Renesas Elec. Corp., 2024 WL 5192070, at *16 n.181 (Del. Ch. 2024), quoting 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 386.[1]

In evaluating the context in which the AUCs were written, the Court may consider extrinsic evidence regarding the circumstances leading to the execution of the AUCs. See Robert Industries, Inc. v. Spence, 362 Mass. 751, 753– 754 (1973); Krumsiek v. Collins Elec. Co., Inc., 105 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 218–219 (2025). So long as such extrinsic evidence is offered “for the purpose of elucidating, but not of contradicting or changing” the contract terms, it may be considered even if the contradict is not ambiguous on its face. See Keating v. Stadium Mgmt. Corp., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 249–250, rev. denied 400 Mass. 1104 (1987), quoting Robert Industries, supra at 754; accord SMS Financial V, LLC v. Conti, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 749–750 (2007). That is true even with respect to fully integrated contracts like the AUCs. See Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass. App.

 

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[1] Accord Lowber v. Bangs, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 728 (1864) (“All mercantile contracts ought to be construed according to their plain meaning, to men of sense and understanding, and not according to forced and refined constructions, which are intelligible only  to  lawyers,  and  scarcely  to  them.”)  (quoting  Crookewit v. Fletcher, 1 Hurlstone & Norman 893, 912 (Ct. of Exchequer 1857)).

 

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Ct. 78, 87 n.11 (1991) (“Even where an agreement is integrated, evidence may be received and used to elucidate (but not contradict) its meaning in context.”); accord Kobayashi v. Orion Ventures, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 496–497 (1997) (though lease had integration clause, jury could consider extrinsic evidence regarding circumstances that led to provision barring landlord from permit operation of “other delis” in building).

3.2.2. Contract Provisions. The key provisions of the parties’ Alternative Utilities Contracts (the “AUCs”) are as follows.

In § 1(c) of the AUCs, MATEP LLC agreed to provide the Hospitals with electricity “on the basis of pricing comparable to pricing available in a competitive market for levels of service comparable to that required to be provided by MATEP pursuant to this Amended Utilities Contract, all as more specifically provided in this Amended Utilities Contract.”

The specifics were provided in § 5(a)(ii). MATEP LLC agreed in this section that (A) “when a competitive market arises in which alternative supplies of electricity at comparable levels of service with specifications and reliability standards at least equal to those provided in this Amended Utilities Contract are actually available … under firm (non-interruptible) agreements, and delivery to the User of such alternative supplies is not prohibited by law, then” (B) MATEP LLC would charge the Hospitals the market “price of … alternative supplies” of electricity, rather than the higher Eversource tariff rate.

Comparable alternative supplies were deemed “actually available” if the Hospital “could contract for and obtain delivery of” such alternative supplies, in the absence of its contract with Harvard. Id. § 5(a)(ii)(A).

The Court concludes that all relevant provisions of the AUCs are unambiguous when considering the contracts as a whole, and that their meaning is therefore a question of law. See Seaco Ins. Co. v. Barbosa, 435 Mass. 772, 779 (2002); Trustees of Beechwood Village Condominium Trust v. USAlliance Federal Credit Union, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 284–285 (2019). “Whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of law.” Eigerman v. Putnam Investments, Inc., 450 Mass. 281, 287 (2007). Even if contract language is hard to parse, that does not make it ambiguous. See Sullivan v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 443 (2006). That the parties disagree about how to read the AUCs does not make them ambiguous either. “[A]mbiguity is not created simply because a controversy exists between parties, each favoring an interpretation contrary to the other’s.” Indus Partners, LLC v. Intelligroup, Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 795

 

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(2010) (affirming summary judgment), quoting Suffolk Constr. Co., Inc. v. Lanco Scaffolding Co., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 729 (1999).

3.2.3. Findings as to Comparable Alternative Supplies. Given the unambiguous language of AUC § 5(a)(ii)(A) quoted above, “alternative supplies of electricity ” are “actually available” in the market “at comparable levels of service” whenever the following conditions are met: (1) the specifications and reliability standards for alternative supplies are at least equal to those provided for in the AUCs; (2) the alternative supplies are actually available in the market under firm, i.e. non-interruptible, agreements; and (3) delivery of such alternative supplies to the Hospitals is not prohibited by law.[2]

The Court finds that the alternative supplies of electricity that have been sold and continue to be sold to power the former HIM facility at 4 Blackfan Circle in the LMA meet all three of these conditions.

First, the electricity provided by contract to 4 Blackfan Circle has specifications and reliability standards that are at least equal to those required of MATEP LLC under the AUCs.

Appendix B to the AUCs establish electricity specifications that MATEP must meet, including the permissible voltage range, maximum voltage flicker, and frequency. Since the electricity supplied to 4 Blackfan Circle is delivered through ISO-NE’s grid, and ISO-NE ensures that the grid meets the same standards, the Court finds that this alternative supply of electricity meets the required specifications.

MATEP points out that the electricity supply contracts for 4 Blackfan Circle do not include these specifications because they are controlled by ISO-NE as operator of the grid, not by retail suppliers of electricity. But that is beside the point. AUC § 5(a)(ii)(A) requires only that be alternative supplies of electricity be “actually available” at these specifications, not that the retail supplier assume a contractual obligation to do the job of ISO-NE to ensure that the electricity supply in fact meets these specifications.

 

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[2] MATEP’s assertion that the AUCs impose an independent requirement of “comparable levels of service”—that is not defined by reference to specifications and reliability standard, the availability of firm (i.e. non- interruptible) supply, and the ability to have the electricity supply delivered to the customer—is without merit. That is not what the AUCs say, and MATEP has not shown that is what the contracting parties meant.

 

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The Court also finds that the supply of electricity through the regional grid as maintained by ISO-NE is extremely reliable, and that the alternative supplies of electricity available in the market are at least as reliable as what MATEP LLC has contracted to provide. Under the AUCs, MATEP LLC must “provide continuous delivery” of electricity to each Hospital, and “avoid non-delivery … at any time” except due to uncontrollable circumstances beyond its control (as addressed in the force majeure provision). The Court finds that alternative supplies of electricity available in the market meet these same standards. ISO- NE procures sufficient capacity, dispatches and controls generation, and operates the transmission grid to ensure that it can procure and provide sufficient capacity to serve all required firm load, and has never failed to do so. The Court credits Mr. Pfeifenberger’s opinion that alternative supplies of electricity available in the market are at least as reliable, and may be more reliable, that the electricity supplied by MATEP to the Hospitals from the Plant.

Second, the Court  finds  that  since  the  retail  electric  supply  contracts  for 4 Blackfan Circle do not permit the supplier to interrupt the supply at times of its choosing, they require the provision of a firm, non-interruptible supply of electricity. The Court finds that, within the electric supply industry, a contract to supply electricity is understood to be “firm” or “non-interruptible” if the load contracted for by the customer cand and will be supplied under all circumstances except emergencies. Since this is how these terms are understood within the industry, the Court finds that this “trade usage” is what MATEP LLC and the Hospitals intended by including these terms in their contracts. Compare Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Const. Reinsurance Corp., 416 Mass. 839, 845 (1994) (where “contract language is ambiguous, evidence of trade usage is admissible to determine the meaning of the agreement”).

Third, the Court finds that delivery of alternative supplies of electricity to the Hospitals (just as to 4 Blackfan Circle) is not prohibited by law. This delivery is accomplished in the manner provided under Massachusetts law: when a supply of electricity is procured by contract, the electricity is generated, delivered to the ISO-NE transmission grid, and delivered to the end user by the electric utility that has monopoly control of the local area delivery network.

MATEP’s argument that alternative supplies of electricity are not “actually available” because they cannot be delivered directly by the retail supplier to the end user is without merit. Indeed, the Court finds that it is frivolous and wholly insubstantial.

 

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When MATEP LLC entered into the AUCs with the Hospitals, the contracting parties understood that Massachusetts law did not permit retail suppliers to deliver electricity directly to any customer, but instead required that suppliers arrange for delivery of electricity to the grid for transmission and ultimate delivery to the customer.

Given these shared understandings regarding the circumstances leading to the execution of the AUCs, the only reasonable understanding of § 5(a)(ii)(A) is that alternative supplies of electricity are “actually available” if the Hospitals could contract to receive them by having the retail supplier arrange for one or more generators to deliver the electricity to the ISO-NE grid for transmission and ultimate delivery by Eversource.

As the parties understood when they entered into the AUCs, Massachusetts law bars retail suppliers from delivering electricity directly to their customers. The Hospitals and MATEP LLC were careful and specific in agreeing that market rates for electricity would apply “when a competitive market arises in which alternative supplies of electricity” that met the standards discussed above would be available. They did not require that a competitive market for the delivery of electricity develop, because everyone involved in the industry understood that delivery of electricity remained a monopoly by law.

Therefore, if the alternative pricing terms of § 5(a)(ii)(A) were available only if retail suppliers could contract to deliver the alternative supplies of electricity directly to each Hospital, then this contract provision would be a nullity. That would not be an appropriate way to read the contract language. See, e.g., Lieber v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 488 Mass. 816, 823 n.15 (2022) (“every word and phrase” of contract should be “given meaning, and none is to be rejected as surplusage if any other course is rationally possible”) (quoting Tupper v. Hancock, 319 Mass. 105, 109 (1946)); Starr v. Fordham, 420 Mass. 178, 192 (1995) (contract interpretation that “gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(a) (1981)).

In sum, MATEP was not entitled to charge the Hospitals for electricity at the Eversource tariff rates going back to January 2022, and is not entitled to do so going forward.

3.2.4. Findings as to Course of Dealing. If contract language establishing the alternative pricing trigger in AUC § 5(a)(ii)(A) were ambiguous, the more than

 

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20-year course of dealing between the parties would confirm that there is a competitive market for electric supply and that the Hospitals are entitled to pay the market rate for electricity that they purchase from MATEP.

When interpreting a contract, “conduct of the parties” after they signed their agreement “is … indicative of their intent.” Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund Ltd. v. PIMCO Income Strategy Fund, 466 Mass. 368, 378 (2013), quoting Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Danvers, 411 Mass. 39, 59 (1991); accord, e.g., Plunkett v. First Fed’l Sav. And Loan Ass’n of Boston, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 294, 302 (1984). “There is no surer way to find out what parties meant, than to see what they have done.” Brigade, supra, quoting Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dutcher, 95 U.S. 269, 273 (1877); accord, e.g., Martino v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 361 Mass. 325, 332 (1972).

From 2001 through 2021, MATEP LLC charged and the Hospitals paid market- based reference prices based on the prices available for alternative supplies of electricity. At no point during this time did MATEP  ever contend that comparable alternative supplies of electricity were not available in the market and as a result seek to charge the Eversource tariff rates. The Court finds that nothing has changed as to the availability of comparable alternative supplies in the market since 2021. This course of dealing is powerful evidence showing that MATEP’s sudden insistence that comparable alternative supplies of electricity are not available in the market is incorrect and without substance.

3.3. The Hospitals’ Right to Select a Reference Standard. MATEP’s assertion that it is entitled to select the market reference price that it will charge to supply electricity, or at least that it is entitled to veto the Hospital’s choice, is also without merit.

The AUCs make clear that, once the conditions set forth in AUC § 5(a)(ii)(A) are satisfied, then the Hospitals are entitled to purchase electricity from MATEP LLC “on the basis of pricing comparable to pricing available in a competitive market for levels of service comparable to that require to be provided by MATEP.” See AUCs § 1(c). By giving the Hospital’s the right to obtain pricing comparable to that available in the market, the AUCs gave the Hospitals the right to select any reference price that meets the contractual standards.

The Court may not read into the AUCs a new requirement that MATEP must approve or has veto power over the selection of a reference price. The Court “cannot rewrite the contract to cure an oversight or relieve a party from the consequences” of the contract’s “plain terms.” Automile Holdings, LLC v.

 

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McGovern, 483 Mass. 797, 817 (2020), quoting National Med. Care, Inc. v. Zigelbaum, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 575–576 (1984).

Though MATEP may regret not having negotiated for the inclusion of such a contract provision, it is bound by the plain and unambiguous language of the AUCs, which “must be enforced according to its terms.” See A.L. Prime Energy Consultant, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 479 Mass. 419, 428 (2018), quoting Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 412 Mass. 703, 706 (1992). “[W]here sophisticated parties choose to embody their agreement in a carefully crafted document,” as in this case, “they are entitled to and should be held to the language  they  chose.”  Fronk  v.  Fowler,  71 Mass.  App.  Ct.  502,  508  (2008), quoting Anderson St. Assocs. v. Boston, 442 Mass. 812, 819 (2004).

“Courts may not by construction add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby make a new contract for the parties under the guise of interpreting the writing.” Acushnet Co. v. Beam, Inc., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 695 (2018), quoting Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 438 Madison Realty Co., 1 N.Y.3d 470, 475 (2004). That is essentially what MATEP is asking the Court to do.

4. Chapter 93A and Implied Covenant Claims. The Hospitals concede in their complaints and in their post-trial requests for rulings of law that their claims against MATEP under G.L. c. 93A arise under § 11 of that statute, meaning that they implicitly acknowledge that in buying electricity from MATEP LLC they are acting in a business context and thus are engaged in trade or commerce.  A consumer that is not engaged in trade or commerce may bring suit to challenge an unfair or deceptive trade practice by bringing suit under G.L. c. 93A, § 9. See McInnes v. LPL Financial, LLC, 466 Mass. 256, 257 n.3 (2013). In contrast, an entity that is acting in a business context, and thus is itself engaged in trade or commerce, must bring suit under § 11 in order to enforce c. 93A. See Frullo v. Landenberger, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 814, 821 (2004); accord, e.g., Linkage Corp. v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 22–23 (1997); Giuffrida v. High Country Investor, Inc., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 237 (2008).

To prove a claim under G.L. c. 93A, § 11, a plaintiff “must establish (1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair method of competition or committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, as defined by G.L. c. 93A, § 2, or the regulations promulgated thereunder; (2) a loss of money or property suffered as a result; and (3) a causal connection between the loss suffered and the defendant's unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice.” See Auto Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 469 Mass. 813, 820 (2014).

 

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For the reasons discussed in this section, the Court finds that the Hospitals have not met their burden of proving their claims under G.L. c. 93A, § 11, that MATEP engaged in unfair or deceptive conduct and thereby caused the Hospitals to lose money or property. Some of the conduct of which the Hospitals complain was not unfair or deceptive within the meaning of c. 93A. Other things that MATEP did constituted violations of c. 93A, but did not cause the Hospitals to suffer any loss of money or property. Either way, the Hospitals have not met their burden of proving these claims.

This also resolves the Hospitals’ claims under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is part of the AUCs. In their post-trial requests for findings and rulings, the Hospitals argue that if they have established that MATEP violated c. 93A then they have also established that MATEP LLC breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. They offer no other basis for their implied covenant claims. It follows that since the Hospitals failed to prove their claims under c. 93A they also failed to prove their claims under the implied covenant.

4.1. Requested Reliability Rider. The Court finds that all three defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive conduct in 2021 when they pressed the Hospitals to impose a condition on the solicitation of bids for a new reference price that MATEP knew could never be met. The “Reliability-Firmness Rider” that MATEP asked the Hospital to add as a condition for bidders seeking to supply electricity to 4 Blackfan Circle could never be satisfied because it would have required suppliers to deliver electricity directly to the customer, which is unlawful under Massachusetts law.

Furthermore, the Court finds that MATEP acted unfairly and deceptively by insisting that without delivery directly to the customer, rather than to ISO-NE’s transmission grid, a competitive supply of electricity could not be comparable to MATEP’s supply obligations under the AUCs. MATEP knew full well that supply and delivery of electricity are separate functions under Massachusetts law. MATEP therefore had no good faith basis for insisting that comparability in delivering was a necessary condition for there to be comparability in supplying electricity.

Nonetheless, the Court also finds that this unfair and deceptive conduct by MATEP did not violate and is not subject to sanction under G.L. c. 93A because it did not cause any of the Hospitals to lose any money or property. To the contrary, as discussed above, the Hospitals did not cause the proposed rider to

 

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be included in the request for bids to supply electricity to 4 Blackfan Circle in 2022, and have not shown that MATEP’s failed request that the proposed rider be included caused the Hospitals to suffer compensable harm in any other way.

Causation of economic harm or injury, in the form of an actual loss of money or property, is a necessary element of a claim for violation of G.L. c. 93A, § 11, or for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or. See, e.g., Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 419 Mass. 462, 468 (1995) (“loss of money or property” is necessary element of claim under § 11); McCone v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 393 Mass. 231, 233–234 & n.8 (1984) (for breach of implied covenant claim, plaintiff must allege facts suggesting they suffered contract damages; alleged harm to reputation or emotional distress does not state claim).

Indeed, proof of legally cognizable harm or injury is a necessary element of any claim under G.L. c. 93A, even if the claim is asserted under § 9 by an entity or individual that was not themselves engaged in trade or commerce. See Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 475 Mass. 67, 73 (2016); Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 464 Mass. 492, 501–503 (2013); Hershenow v. Enter. Rent-A- Car Co. of Boston, Inc., 445 Mass. 790, 800–802 (2006). There can be no liability under c. 93A if the allegedly unfair or deceptive act or practice did not cause some compensable injury. See, e.g., Butts v. Freedman, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 827, 831–832 (2020) (claim under § 11); see also Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, Inc., 445 Mass. 790, 801 (2006) (claim under c. 93A, § 9).

“[T]o meet the injury requirement under G.L. c. 93A, § 9(1) or 11, a plaintiff must have suffered a ‘separate, identifiable harm arising from the … violation’ that is distinct ‘from the claimed unfair or deceptive conduct itself.’ ” Bellermann II, supra, quoting Tyler, supra, at 503. A business or consumer is not entitled to collect even nominal damages under c. 93A without proving that the violation caused some sort of “separate” and “distinct” injury. Tyler, supra; Karaa v. Kuk Yim, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 725 (2014). A plaintiff that brings a claim under c. 93A cannot show that they have suffered compensable injury “merely by showing that [they have] incurred attorney’s fees and other costs in bringing an action under the statute.” Tech Plus, Inc. v. Ansel, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 12, 21 (2003); accord Doering Eqpt. Co. v. John Deere Co.—A Division of Deere & Co., 61 Mass. App. ct. 850, 858 (2004).

In enacting c. 93A, “the Legislature … did not intend to confer on plaintiffs who have suffered no harm the right to receive a nominal damage award which will

 

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in turn entitle them to a sometimes significant attorney’s fee recovery.” Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos. Inc., 442 Mass. 381, 401 (2004), quoting Lord v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 309, 321–322 (2004); accord Butts, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 832 (plaintiff suing under c. 93A, § 11, not entitled to attorneys’ fees merely for identifying unfair or deceptive conduct that caused no harm or loss).

In sum, since the Hospitals have not established that MATEP’s request for the reliability rider caused them to lose any money or property, or to suffer any other compensable harm, they have not shown that this conduct by MATEP constituted a violation under G.L. c. 93A, § 11 or § 9.

4.2. Charging and Collecting the Reliability Adder. The Court finds that MATEP’s conduct in assessing and collecting charges under its proposed Reliability Adder did not violate c. 93A, even though it constitute a breach of the parties’ contracts.

“[T]he mere breach of a contract, without more, does not amount to a c. 93A violation.” Madan v. Royal  Indem.  Co.,  26 Mass.  App.  Ct.  756,  762  (1989).  A breach of contract would violate c. 93A only if “the nature, purpose, and effect of the challenged conduct is coercive or extortionate.” Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Backleaf, LLC, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 507 (2004); accord, e.g., Zabin v. Picciotto, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 169 (2008), rev. denied, 453 Mass. 1103, 1105 (2009).

“In the absence of conduct having that quality, a failure to perform obligations under a written lease” or other contract, “even though deliberate and for reasons of self-interest, does not” violate c. 93A. Atkinson v. Rosenthal, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 219, 226 (1992) (no c. 93A violation where tenant deliberately abandoned and thereby breached commercial lease); accord H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington Street, LLC, 489 Mass. 1, 17 n.12 (2022) (“Even an intentional or knowing breach of contract, standing alone, is insufficient for a c.93A, § 11, violation.”); see also Kobayashi v. Orion Ventures, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 505, rev. denied, 425 Mass. 1102 (1997) (landlord’s breach of non-competition clause did not violate c. 93A, as plaintiff did not show that landlord violated lease “to gain an economic advantage” over tenant “or to extort a concession”).

The Court recognizes that “commercial extortion,” undertaken “by one business to ‘extract undeserved concessions from other business entities,’ ” is an unfair trade practice that violates c. 93A. H1 Lincoln, 489 Mass. at 15, quoting Anthony’s Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 474 (1991) (“commercial

 

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extortion”), and Renovator’s Supply, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 419, 430 (2008) (“extract undeserved concessions…”).

But the Court finds that that MATEP did not use or attempt to use the Reliability Adder charges to extort undeserved concessions. And it finds that MATEP never threatened, explicitly or implicitly, to stop providing utilities to the Hospitals if they did not pay the Reliability Adder charges.

The Hospitals are large, sophisticated entities that were in no way cowed by and readily rebuffed MATEP’s limited efforts to negotiate new contractual arrangements. “[B]usinesses seeking relief under Section 11 are held to a stricter standard than consumers in terms of what constitutes unfair or deceptive conduct.” H1 Lincoln, 489 Mass. at 15 n.10, quoting Giuffrida, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 238. Thus, “the business-to-business context of G.L. c. 93A, § 11, … requires a higher degree of misconduct for a violation than in the consumer protection context of G.L. c. 93A, § 9.” Id. The Hospitals have not met their burden of proving that MATEP used its failed Reliability Adder to engage in commercial extortion, especially keeping in mind the stricter standard that applies under G.L. c. 93A, § 11.

4.3. Misrepresentations about the Reliability Adder. The Hospitals contend that MATEP also violated G.L. c. 93A by making a number of misrepresentations in its attempts to justify the Reliability Adder.

The Court finds that the Hospitals have not proved this aspect of their c. 93A claim because the statements that they challenge were all statements of opinion or predictions about the future, not actionable statements of fact. MATEP’s assertions about whether the Plant could operate as a stand-along island, whether the Plant could fulfill the Hospital’s backup obligations, whether MATEP needed the Reliability Adder to compensate for unplanned maintenance and capital expenditures, and whether MATEP might become insolvent in the future without the Reliability Adder are not statements of fact that if incorrect could constitute negligent misrepresentation.

“A negligent misrepresentation of fact may … constitute an unfair or deceptive act within the meaning of G.L. c. 93A, if the truth could have been reasonably ascertained.” Quinlan v. Clasby, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 102, rev. denied, 451 Mass. 1103 (2008) (emphasis added). However, “[a] statement on which liability for misrepresentation may be based must be one of fact, not of expectation, estimate, opinion, or judgment.” von Schonau-Riedweg v. Rothschild Bank AG, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 471, 497 (2019), quoting Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass. App.

 

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Ct. 72, 79 (1991). Thus, “ ‘false statements of opinion [or] of conditions to exist in the future,’ … cannot sustain a claim for negligent misrepresentation.” Cumis Ins. Society v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 455 Mass. 458, 474 (2009) , quoting Yerid v. Mason, 341 Mass. 527, 530 (1960).

4.4. Misrepresentation about MATEP’s New Contract Proposal. The Hospitals also contend that MATEP violated c. 93A when it proposed a concession-style contract in 2023 and claimed the new contract would save the Hospitals money, based on an analysis inflated the projected costs for electricity under the existing contracts by double-counting several components of permitted charges.

Once again, however, the Hospitals have not shown that this purported misrepresentation caused them to lose any money or property, or to even to suffer any other kind of loss that would have been compensable if the Hospitals had brought suit under G.L. c. 93A, § 9. To the contrary, the Court finds that the Hospitals’ consultants quickly identified the double-counting and as a result the Hospitals promptly disregarded MATEP’s financial analysis of its new contract proposal. Since loss or injury is an element of a c. 93A claim, this part of the c. 93A fails as well. See, e.g., Butts, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 831–832.

4.5. Back Billing. Finally, the Hospitals assert that MATEP violated c. 93A in 2024 by assessing $120 million in retroactive charges back to January 2022 on the theory that the Hospitals should have been paying the Eversource tariff rate for electricity. This aspect of the c. 93A claims fails for reasons discussed above. First, although MATEP breached the AUCs by seeking to assess these back charges, a mere breach of contract does not violate c. 93A, and the Court finds that the Hospitals have not established that this back-billing was extortionate. Second, in any case, the Hospitals have not established that they lost any money or property, or suffered any other kind of injury that would be compensable if they had sued under G.L. c. 93A, § 9, as a result of the challenged back-billing. The Court finds that the Hospitals immediately disputed and have never paid any portion of the back-billed charges.

ORDERS

Each of the Plaintiffs is entitled to recoup the following amount of damages because of Defendants’ unlawful assessment of the Reliability Adder in the following amounts, plus statutory interest of 12 percent per year running from May 1, 2023: (i) Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc., $3,698,795.28; (ii) The Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Inc., $3.724,808.67; (iii) Dana-Farber

 

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Cancer Institute, Inc., $2,112,363.59; (iv) Joslin Diabetes Center, Inc., $350,903.98; (v) President and Fellows of Harvard College, $2,419,381.84; and (vi) The Children’s Hospital Corporation, $3,759,141.46.

Separate final judgments shall enter in each of these six cases providing as follows:

This case having come before the Court and the issues have been duly heard and decided, in part on the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings and in part after a non-jury trial on the remaining claims, it is hereby declared, ordered, and adjudged that:

(a) since January 2022, as before, comparable alternative supplies of electricity – within the meaning of § 5(a)(ii)(A) of the Amended Utilities Contract between MATEP LLC and the Plaintiff – exist and are available in the market;

(b) the Plaintiff was and is therefore entitled to pay an electricity rate equal to the reference price selected by the Plaintiff for any comparable alternative supply of electricity within the meaning of § 5(a)(ii)(A) of the Amended Utilities Contract;

(c) the Reliability Adder charge for electricity that Defendants assessed starting in January 2022 is invalid under and violates the Amended Utilities Contract between MATEP LLC and the Plaintiff;

(d) the back charges for electricity that Defendants assessed against Plaintiff based on the Eversource tariff rate going back to January 2022 are invalid and violate this Amended Utilities Contract;

(e) Plaintiff shall take [insert the amount specified above in this order], plus statutory interest running from May 1, 2023, from MATEP LLC to recoup the Reliability Adder payments that it made to MATEP LLC; and

(f) Plaintiff shall take nothing on its claims under G.L. c. 93A, under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or for unjust enrichment.

/s/Kenneth W. Salinger

Justice of the Superior Court

November 10, 2026