LISA SIVIERI vs. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Lisa Sivieri ('Sivieri'), brought this action against the
defendant, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Transitional
Assistance (the 'DTA') seeking damages for gender discrimination (Count I);
hostile environment sexual harassment (Count II); retaliation (Count III); and
breach of contract (Count IV).1 Count III of the complaint was dismissed on
June 26, 2003 (MacLeod, J). The matter is before the court on the DTA's Motion
for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the DTA's motion is ALLOWED in
part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are as
follows.2 In 1997, Sivieri began working for the DTA as a paralegal specialist
in the Administrative Disqualification Unit (the 'ADU') responsible for
prosecuting welfare fraud.

The work involved a variety of tasks and activities, including receiving and
reviewing reports, interviewing case workers about recipients possibly
receiving benefits illegally, and preparing case files and appearing on behalf
of the DTA at hearings regarding recipient eligibility. Sivieri quickly learned
the functions of the position and her job performance was consistently
evaluated as satisfactory or better. In her January 2001 performance
evaluation, Sivieri was rated overall as 'exceeds expectations.' She received
regular salary increases and within a year and a half was entrusted with more
responsibilities, including training new hires in the unit.3

Within the first ten months of her employment with the DTA, Sivieri married
and began thinking about starting a family. In July of 1999, when Sivieri was
about five months pregnant, she applied for a position as a Training Paralegal
in response to a posting by the DTA. She was interviewed for the position but
was not selected and the job was given to another paralegal in the unit whom
Sivieri had helped train, Cynthia Sullivan ('Sullivan'). Sullivan had worked
for the DTA for less than a year and had no children. 4 On November 30, 1999,
Sivieri gave birth to a daughter, Olivia.

Although Sivieri had noticed a negative attitude in the ADU towards women
with small children, including a failure to promote them, she did not recognize
the extent of the negativity or react to it until after her own child was born.
Sivieri's supervisors and managers often made negative remarks about women with
young children. When Sivieri was denied extended maternity leave, a manager, Al
Furoli, told her that he didn't have children but 'he c[ould] understand how it
is to leave a small child at home.' Sivieri's direct supervisor, Debra Graham
('Graham'), commented frequently about the negative effects of having women
employees bearing children. Such comments included Graham repeatedly stating,
with respect to the ADU's workload, that the unit would remain effective 'as
long as nobody else g[ot] pregnant.'5 None of the comments made by Sivieri's
supervisors were sexual in nature.

In the spring of 2000, Sullivan was promoted to EBT supervisor and was again
promoted in the spring of 2001 to Compliance Manager. Other paralegals in the
unit who had been hired after Sivieri and been trained by her also received
transfers or promotions; in May of 2001, Kristin Naugler ('Naugler') was
promoted to the Lead Paralegal position and in November of 2001, Judy Coloumbe
('Coloumbe') was promoted to a Quality Control position and was allowed to
transfer to an office closer to her home.6 At the time of their promotions,
Coloumbe had no children and Naugler had an eleven'year'old daughter.

After Naugler was given the Lead Paralegal position, Sivieri asked Graham
why she had been repeatedly passed over for promotion. Graham said that the
arrival of Sivieri's child had led the ADU managers to conclude that she no
longer sought promotion. Graham also stated that she was surprised Sivieri was
upset at not getting promoted considering her family obligations at home. 7
With regard to why Sullivan and Coloumbe were promoted over Sivieri, Graham
stated that they could put in extra hours at the end of the week, which Sivieri
took to be a reference to the fact that neither Sullivan nor Coloumbe had small
children.

After Sivieri questioned why she was not promoted, she was subjected to
increased management scrutiny; her decisions were constantly second'guessed,
her work was heavily criticized and sent back for her to redo, and her
responsibilities were curtailed.8 This scrutiny, coupled with the DTA's
negativity towards women with small children, caused Sivieri emotional and
psychological distress and she began experiencing a range of physical symptoms.
She also postponed having a second child, which caused strain in her marriage.
On February 20, 2002, upon the advice of her physician and counselor, Sivieri
requested to be selected for a voluntary layoff from her employment with the
DTA. As a condition of the DTA agreeing to her request, Sivieri executed a
'Waiver of Right to Appeal Selection for Layoff.' In that document, Sivieri
acknowledged that she waived 'any and all right to appeal [her] selection for
layoff . . . in any forum.'

Sivieri filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination ('MCAD') on November 13, 2001.9 After leaving her position with
the DTA in February of 2002, Sivieri removed her MCAD complaint to this court
on May 20, 2002. On or about October 2, 2002, the DTA filed a motion to
dismiss. On June 26, this court dismissed Count III of the plaintiff's
complaint, finding that Sivieri's retaliation claim was barred by her failure
to allege retaliation in her MCAD complaint. Sivieri's claim for breach of
contract has been withdrawn.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A court should grant summary judgment where the record, including pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and affidavits,
shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c); McGuinness v.
Cotter, 412 Mass. 617, 620 (1992). The court must construe facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. The moving party bears the initial
burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17
(1989). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the
party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Pederson, 404 Mass. at 17. A
party moving for summary judgment who does not bear the burden of proof at
trial may demonstrate the absence of a triable issue either by submitting
affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's
case or by showing that the nonmoving party has no reasonable expectation of
proving an essential element of its case at trial. Flesner v. Tech.
Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991); Kourouvacilis v. General
Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991).

II. Gender Discrimination

A. Timeliness of Claims

A.

The DTA contends that Sivieri's claims are barred by c. 151B's limitation
period. At the time Sivieri filed her MCAD complaint, G. L. c. 151B, ' 5
provided that "[a]ny complaint filed pursuant to this section must be so
filed within six months after the alleged act of discrimination."10
Sivieri filed her complaint on November 13, 2001. Therefore, Sivieri is barred
from seeking relief for any alleged acts of discrimination occurring prior to
May 13, 2001, unless those acts were part of a continuing violation. See 804
CMR 1.10(2) (c. 151B's limitations period 'shall not be a bar to filing in
those instances where facts are alleged which indicate that the unlawful
conduct complained of is of a continuing nature.')11 For the continuing
violation doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must prove that: "(1) at least
one discriminatory act occurred within the six month limitations period; (2)
the alleged timely discriminatory acts have a substantial relationship to the
alleged untimely discriminatory acts . . . [and] (3) earlier violations outside
the six'month limitations period did not trigger [the plaintiff's] 'awareness
and duty' to assert [her] rights.' Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Comm'n. Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 632, 642 (2004) citing
804 Code Mass. Regs. ' 1.03(2). A plaintiff's 'awareness and duty' is triggered
when she 'knew or could have formed a reasonable belief that the earlier
violations were discriminatory.' Id. at 644, n.16.

Sivieri appears to have been denied two promotions within the six'month
limitations period provided by c. 151B, the promotion to Lead Paralegal given
to Naugler in May of 2001 and the promotion to Quality Control given to
Coloumbe in November of 2001.12 While these rejections for promotion do have a
'substantial relationship' to Sivieri's prior rejections, Sivieri acknowledged
in her deposition that she was aware of the DTA's pattern of refusing to
promote women with small children 'pretty early on,' prior to her application
for the Training Paralegal position in 1999. Therefore, Sivieri knew or could
have formed a reasonable belief that the promotion denials occurring prior to
May 13, 2001 were discriminatory at the time they occurred and the continuing
violation doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, any claims pertaining to those
events are time'barred. Those events, however, may still be used as background
evidence to support the surviving claims. Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop
Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 530 n.10 (2001)('plaintiff who has a seasonable
claim may use events that occurred prior to the six'month limitation period as
background evidence . . . even though she cannot recover damages for the
time'barred events.").

B. Application of Chapter 151B, ' 4

Under G.L. c. 151B, ' 4, it is unlawful: [f]or an employer, by himself or
his agent, because of race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex,
sexual orientation . . . genetic information, or ancestry of any individual to
refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such
individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification.

Sivieri alleges that the DTA discriminated against her based on a gender
stereotype; namely, the belief that a woman cannot be both a good mother and a
committed worker. The DTA asserts that such discrimination, if it occurred, was
based on parental status, not sex, and that parents are not a protected class
under c. 151B. Whether an employment decision based upon stereotypes about a
mother's role in the workplace constitutes sex discrimination is a matter of
first impression in the Massachusetts courts. Because the term 'sex' is not
defined in the statutory framework of c. 151B, the court will look to case law,
both in Massachusetts and under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. ' 2000e'2(a)(1), the equivalent federal civil rights legislation, for
guidance in applying the law to the instant case. See Dahill v. Police
Department of Boston, 434 Mass. 233 (2001). Although the court 'is not bound by
Federal precedent interpreting an analogous Federal statute, [it] may
appropriately consider that precedent as useful guidance.' See College'Town,
Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass.
156, 162 n.3, 163'164 (1987), quoting Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 Mass. 160, 167 (1978).

A. Stereotyped Statements as Evidence of Discriminatory Animus

The Supreme Court has held that 'stereotyped remarks' can be evidence of
gender discrimination. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
In Price Waterhouse, Hopkins, a female manager in an accounting firm, was
denied partnership after she failed to conform to gender stereotypes. During
the review process, '[o]ne partner described her as 'macho;' another suggested
that she 'overcompensated for being a woman;' [and] a third advised her to take
'a course at charm school.'' Id. at 235. Hopkins was also told that 'in order
to improve her chances for partnership . . . [she] should 'walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make'up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry.'' Id. The Court found that '[i]t takes no
special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive
female employee as requiring 'a course at charm school.' Nor . . . does it
require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed
'interpersonal skills' can be corrected by a soft'hued suit or a new shade of
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills
that has drawn the criticism.' The Court concluded that Price Waterhouse had
discriminated against Hopkins by permitting such stereotyped attitudes to play
a role in its decision not to promote her to partner. Id.

Applying the Price Waterhouse framework to facts similar to those in the
case at bar, the Second Circuit found that employment decisions based upon the
stereotype that women cannot be both good mothers and good workers can
constitute gender discrimination under Title VII. Back v. Hastings Union Free
School District, 365 F.3d 107 (2nd Cir. 2004).13 In Back, an elementary school
psychologist was denied tenure and terminated after being subjected to numerous
allegedly discriminatory comments including (a) inquiries about how she was
"planning on spacing [her] offspring" and suggestions that she
"wait until [her son] was in kindergarten to have another child," (b)
a request that she 'not get pregnant until [her supervisor] retire[d],' and (c)
statements that her supervisors "did not know how [she] could possibly do
this job with children,' that she should 'maybe . . . reconsider whether she
could be a mother and do this job," and that 'because [she] was a young
mother, [she] would not continue [her] commitment to the work place." 14
Id. at 115. Citing to Price Waterhouse, the court held that the question of
what constitutes a gender'based stereotype, must be answered in the particular
context in which it arises, and without undue formalization . . . Just as 'it
takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an
aggressive female employee as requiring a course at charm school,' so it takes
no special training to discern stereotyping in the view that a woman cannot 'be
a good mother' and have a job that requires long hours, or in the statement
that a mother who received tenure 'would not show the same level of commitment
[she] had shown because [she] had little ones at home.'

Id. at 120 (internal citation omitted). Such stereotyped statements, the
court held, constitute evidence of gender discrimination. Id. See also Lynn v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981)
("When plaintiffs establish that decisions regarding . . . employment are
motivated by discriminatory attitudes relating to race or sex, or are rooted in
concepts which reflect such attitudes, however subtly, courts are obligated to
afford the relief provided by Title VII.").

Other circuits have adopted similar approaches to gender stereotyping in the
context of pregnancy discrimination cases.15 In Santiago'Ramos v. Centennial
P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2000), the plaintiff, who had
one child when she started working for the defendant and planned on having
another, was subject to a number of comments by her supervisors 'suggesting
their concern about [her] possibly having a second child while working at
Centennial, as well as concern about women with children working at Centennial
in general.'16 Santiago'Ramos was also "specifically questioned [about]

whether she would be able to manage her work and family responsibilities."
The First Circuit found that stereotypical comments like these supported a
finding of discriminatory animus based on pregnancy. See also Sheehan v. Donlen
Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044'45 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding, in a Pregnancy
Discrimination Act case, that a reasonable jury could have concluded that
"a supervisor's statement to a woman known to be pregnant that she was
being fired so that she could 'spend more time at home with her children'
reflected unlawful motivations because it invoked widely understood stereotypes
the meaning of which is hard to mistake"); id. at 1044 (remarks by the
head of plaintiff's department that "she would be happier at home with her
children" provided direct evidence of discriminatory animus).

The full Commission of the MCAD has also recognized that employment
decisions "based upon the stereotypical belief that women will become the
primary caretaker for their children and will not be capable of performing
their jobs after they marry and have children" is actionable as sex
discrimination under G.L.c. 151B. Ntapalis v. Halem & Schrader, P.C., 15
M.D.L.R. 1117, 1125 (1993).17 In Ntapalis, a dentist, who was single at the
time that she was hired, was told that her unmarried status was "a real
plus for the facility" and that her employers believed that a "single
employee would be more willing to put in long hours...and that a husband and
family responsibilities would distract her from her work." After Ntapalis
got married, her managerial duties were taken away from her. While the MCAD
acknowledged that '[m]arital status per se is not a protected category under
Chapter 151B,' it determined that Ntapalis's employer's bias against marriage
was based on gender stereotypes and therefore, constituted sex discrimination
under c. 151B.

In light of these decisions, and the legislative directive that c. 151B be
applied liberally,18 the court finds that stereotypical remarks about the
incompatibility of motherhood and employment can be evidence of gender
discrimination. These types of statements reflect a discriminatory animus not
towards parenthood, but towards women, based upon antiquated ideas about what a
woman's role in society should be. Basing employment decisions on such
sex'based overgeneralizations constitutes gender discrimination prohibited by
c. 151B.

In the case at bar, Sivieri has alleged and put forth evidence that the DTA
denied her promotions based upon her status as a mother of small children and
the stereotypical belief that she could not be both a hard worker and a good
mother. Accordingly, the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case of sex
discrimination under Chapter 151B sufficient to survive a motion for summary
judgment.

The DTA argues that Sivieri has not set forth a prima facie case of sex
discrimination because she has failed to establish that male employees received
promotions over her. It would blink reality to deny that a considerable part of
our society believes that mothers are principally responsible for the care of
young children and are therefore less effective as employees. Thus, 'where
stereotypes are considered, the notions that mothers are insufficiently devoted
to work, and that work and motherhood are incompatible, are properly considered
to be, themselves, gender'based.' Back, 365 F.3d at 121 citing Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728, n.5 (2003)(explicitly calling the
stereotype that "women's family duties trump those of the workplace"
a "gender stereotype."). Obviously, gender discrimination is more
blatant when it works to the advantage of male employees. However,
discrimination against mothers is no less corrosive when that discrimination
results in the advancement of another woman who is not a mother. But See
Coleman v. B'G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199,1203
(10th Cir. 1997)(finding that discrimination against women with small children
qualifies as 'gender'plus' discrimination and that 'gender'plus plaintiffs can
never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of the opposite
gender.').19

III. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Chapter 151B makes it
unlawful for any employer, personally or through its agents, to sexually harass
an employee. G.L. c. 151B, ' 4(16A). The term 'sexual harassment' is defined by
the statute as 'sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature.' G.L. c. 151B, ' 1(18). There are two
types of sexual harassment: (1) quid pro quo; and (2) hostile work environment.
Sivieri has not alleged quid pro quo sexual harassment.20

Hostile work environment based sexual harassment exists when 'sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature . . . have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile,
humiliating or sexually offensive work environment.' G.L. c. 151B, ' 1(18)(b).
In order to prove such a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must establish
that the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive enough to
interfere with a reasonable person's work performance. See Muzzy v. Cahillane
Motors, Inc., 434 Mass. 409, 411 (2001).

Sivieri has failed to set forth a claim for hostile work environment sexual
harassment. She has not alleged that she was subjected to any sexual advances
or requests or any physical or verbal conduct of a sexual nature.21 Sivieri's
allegations, instead, relate only to her status as a mother with small
children. Accordingly, Count II of the plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the DTA's Motion for
Summary Judgment be ALLOWED as to Count I, as it pertains to incidents
occurring prior to May 13, 2001, DENIED as to Count I, as it pertains to
incidents occurring after May 13, 2001 and ALLOWED as to Count II.

__________________________ Raymond J. Brassard

Superior Court Justice

Date: June _____, 2006

Footnotes

1. Sivieri has since withdrawn her claim for breach of contract.

2. The facts are drawn from the plaintiff's complaint, the Affidavit of Lisa
Sivieri, the Deposition of Lisa Sivieri, the Affidavit of Ann'Marie Locke, and
the Affidavit of Leah Livingstone.

3. The DTA singled Sivieri out for special projects and designated her to
sit both on its Committee for Diversity Awareness (in 1998) and on its
committee for the Performance Recognition Award (in 2000 and 2001). Sivieri
received an award on account of her contribution to the Committee on Diversity
Awareness.

4. While Sullivan had worked for the DTA for less than a year, she had
worked as a paralegal with a personal injury law firm for more than thirteen
years prior to moving over to the DTA. Sullivan has a bachelor's degree but not
a paralegal's certificate.

5. Two other female employees with small children in the ADU, Leah
Livingston and Ann Marie Locke, also noticed the unit's negative attitude
towards Sivieri and themselves and felt they were targeted for criticism. Locke
stated that the attitude interfered with her ability to perform her job and
made her dread going to work. She eventually quit her job with the DTA for
those reasons.

6. None of these positions were posted by the DTA and Sivieri did not apply
for any of them. Sivieri contends, however, that she informed her supervisors
that she was interested in staying at the DTA and progressing within the
department. She further asserts that it is the policy of the DTA that once an
employee has applied for a promotion, his or her supervisors are aware of his
or her interest in advancing and it is not necessary to apply again.

7. Another paralegal with small children, Leah Livingstone, who was also
seeking a promotion, asserted in her affidavit that Graham told her that 'once
[her] responsibilities at home became a lot lighter, maybe there would be
something else [she] could do at work,' or words to that effect.

8. Specifically, Sivieri was frequently called into her supervisors' offices
and questioned with respect to the quality of her work, the sick time she took,
her mileage requests, the time she took for lunch, and her attire.

9. Sivieri's MCAD charge states:

I have been working for DTA for approximately five years. Since I had my
child approximately two years ago, I have been subjected to unequal terms and
conditions by co'workers, especially in supervisory positions who do not have
small children. I have been passed up for about three promotions. These
promotions have gone to women without small children or no children at all.
Each person has been there for a shorter amount of time than I have. The
Assistant Director told me that she was surprised that I would want to take on
more responsibility at work since I have so much responsibility at home and the
two women who don't have children can put in the extra hours at work. However,
I was told at the same time that my work was pleasing. I am subjected to
ongoing comments about small children. Jobs are created for employees without
children and they are accommodated more often than employees with children. I
feel that I have been subjected to unlawful discrimination because I am a
female with a small child.

10. The Legislature amended G. L. c. 151B, ' 5 in 2002, extending the
limitations period from six months to 300 days. St. 2002, c. 223, ' 1.

11. Both Federal decisions and the MCAD distinguish between two different
varieties of continuing violations: "systemic" and
"serial." Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n.
Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 632, 642, n. 14 (2004). 'A systemic violation
is the maintenance of a general practice or policy aimed at members of a
protected class of employees . . . By contrast, a serial violation is comprised
of an interlinked succession of related events, stemming from a common
discriminatory animus, with at least one act of harassment occurring within the
limitations period." Id. and cases cited.

12. The record states only that Naugler was promoted in May of 2001 and
Coloumbe was promoted in November of 2001. It does not specify any dates. For
the purposes of this motion, the court assumes that these promotions occurred
within the six'month period between May 13, 2001 and November 13, 2001. Even if
Coloumbe's promotion occurred after November 13, 2001, Sivieri's claim relating
to that promotion would be saved by the reasonable relation doctrine. "The
reasonable relation doctrine operates to prevent an amendment from being
time'barred if it is sufficiently connected to the [original MCAD] charge . .
." Davis v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 251 F.3d 227, 233 (1st Cir. 2001);
see also 804 Code Mass.Regs. ' 1.10(6)(a) ("An amendment alleging
additional acts constituting unlawful discriminatory practices related to or
arising out of the subject matter of the original complaint may be made by
Order of the Commissioner. Amendments shall relate back to the original filing
date.").

13. The Back court found that the principle of Price Waterhouse 'applies as
much to the supposition that a woman will conform to a gender stereotype (and
therefore will not, for example, be dedicated to her job), as to the
supposition that a woman is unqualified for a position because she does not
conform to a gender stereotype.' Back, 365 F.3d at 119.

14. Back also alleged that her supervisors became hypercritical of her work,
falsely accused her of misconduct, and removed positive letters from her file.

15. Pregnancy discrimination is expressly prohibited by Title VII which
categorizes employment decisions made "because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions," as decisions made
"because of sex." 42 U.S.C ' 2000e(k). Massachusetts courts have also
recognized that differential treatment on the basis of pregnancy constitutes
gender discrimination under G.L.c. 151B. See Massachusetts Elec. Co. v.
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 Mass. 160, 167'68 (1978).
16One supervisor stated that 'that he preferred unmarried, childless women
because they would give 150% to the job.' Another asked Santiago'Ramos whether
it was possible for her to handle simultaneously her job, childcare, and
marital responsibilities. Several times, he questioned how her husband was
managing, considering she was not home to cook for him. Two weeks before she
was dismissed Santiago'Ramos was asked how well her work was proceeding in
light of her child. She responded that her work was going well and that she
planned to have a second child within several years. Mayberry stated that
having another child was a lot of work, and he questioned whether
Santiago'Ramos could perform her job effectively after having a second child.
She responded that she would be able to meet both work and family obligations.

17. Massachusetts courts afford deference to MCAD policies and decisions
because of 'the express delegation of authority by the Legislature in G.L. c.
151B, ' 2, empowering the MCAD to act forcefully to implement the statute in
order to eliminate discrimination at root level.' Cuddyer, 343 Mass. at 536.

18. Under G.L. c. 151B, ' 9, Chapter 151B 'shall be construed liberally for
the accomplishment of its purposes . . .'

19. The DTA also argues that Sivieri has failed to establish a prima facie
case of sex discrimination because she did not apply for any of the promotions
that occurred after July 1999. However, none of these jobs were posted and
Sivieri and another DTA employee have stated in their affidavits that it is the
policy of the DTA that once an employee has applied for a promotion, his or her
supervisors are aware of his or her interest in advancing and it is not
necessary to apply again. Furthermore, the DTA's failure to post the jobs could
be evidence of discriminatory animus if, as Sivieri contends, the DTA did not
post the jobs in order to keep Sivieri unaware of their availability.

20. Quid pro quo sexual harassment involves 'sexual advances, requests for
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when (a)
submission to or rejection of such advances, requests or conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment or as a basis for
employment decisions.' G.L. c. 151B, ' 1(18).

21. When asked in her deposition if any of the comments or conduct directed
at her was of a sexual nature, Sivieri replied, 'No.'