A review of the cases decidied by the Supreme Judicial Court during 1894, when it first occupied the Old Courthouse, provides interesting insights into the social and economic fabric of the times.

The year's decisions included causes of action either repealed or no longer prosecuted as such: bastardy process, Farrell v. Weitz, 160 Mass. 288 (1894); adultery, Watts v. Watts, 160 Mass. 464 (1894); writ of dower, O'Gara v. Neylon, 161 Mass. 140 (1894); alienation of affections, Sanborn v. Gale, 162 Mass. 412 (1894); and breach of promise of marriage, Van Houten v. Morse, 162 Mass. 414 (1894).

Criminal appeals were surprisingly few, and involved offenses as varied as gaming, Commonwealth v. Swain, 160 Mass. 354 (1894); Commonwealth v. Warren, 161 Mass. 281 (1894); attempted rape, Commonwealth v. Farrell, 160 Mass. 525 (1894); larceny of whiffletrees Commonwealth v. Swain, 160 Mass. 530 (1894); sale of milk "not of the standard quality," Commonwealth v. Warren, 160 Mass. 535 (1894); sodomy, Commonwealth v. Dill, 160 Mass. 536 (1894); attempted procurement of an abortion, Commonwealth v. Leach, 160 Mass. 542 (1894)("in consequence whereof [the woman] died on the following day."); embezzlement, Commonwealth v. Logue, 160 Mass. 551 (1894); and attempted extortion, Commonwealth v. White, 162 Mass. 403 (1894)(reversing defendant milk inspector's conviction for threatening to charge persons with peddling "milk not of good standard quality).

A popular prosecution, it seems, was for "unlawfully exposing intoxicating liquors for sale" without a license, Commonwealth v. Goulet, 160 Mass. 276 (1894)(reversing conviction on grounds of former acquittal); Commonwealth v. Vincent, 160 Mass. 280 (1894); Commonwealth v. Gavin, 160 Mass. 523 (1894)(sustaining ruling on evidence that beer was "intoxicating liquor"); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 160 Mass. 528 (1894)(duly licensed premises still illegal if within 400 feet of school on same street); Commonwealth v. Brelsford, 161 Mass. 61 (1894)(dandelion beer was "intoxicating liquor"; sustaining judge's overruling of defendant's request to submit samples to jury to taste and test to determine whether intoxicating); Commonwealth v. McManus, 161 Mass. 64 (1894)(per curiam: evidence, inter alia, that thirty to forty gallons of whiskey was found sufficient to warrant finding that it was maintained for sale where defendant's family consisted of self, wife, and three children); Commonwealth v. Early, 161 Mass. 186 (1894); Commonwealth v. Kyne, 162 Mass. 146 (1894); Commonwealth v. Reed, 162 Mass. 215 (1894)(defendant guilty although sales on premises made by another); Commonwealth v. Boutwell, 162 Mass. 230 (1894); Commonwealth v. Martin, 162 Mass. 402 (1894)("[C]ase needs no discussion" where defendant carpenter's shop contained 100 full or empty beer bottles, more than four gallons of whiskey, and serving paraphernalia).

In the early 1890s sanitation could be a problem, and gave rise to a number of suits. Riley v. Lissner, 160 Mass. 330 (1894)(action for personal injuries suffered in fall into kitchen cesspool caused by negligent replacement of cover by landlord); Littlehale v. Osgood, 161 Mass. 340 (1894)(tort for misrepresentation that leased home was in good sanitary condition where undisclosed well connected to water closet allegedly caused infant to contract diphtheria); Bertie v. Flagg, 161 Mass. 504 (1894)(wrongful death action for typhoid fever allegedly occasioned by landlord's failure to repair defective drain; Holmes, J.: "We are of opinion that the landlord was under no obligation to repair it … [and] that he was under no obligation to disclose [the defect].").

There were dog bite cases. Boulester v. Parsons, 161 Mass. 182 (1894), was a statutory action for the loss of a horse being lead behind a wagon and bitten by the defendant's dog, in consequence of which the horse died; the defendant contended that leading a horse in such a manner was negligence.

Per Lathrop, J.:

To hold that the question whether leading a horse behind a wagon should be submitted to the jury as evidence of negligence . . . in inducing an attack by a dog, would render it necessary to submit to the jury the question whether the color of the horse or of the wagon, or of the clothes of the driver, might not have induced an attack. The law does not pay this respect to the characteristics or prejudices of dogs.

Id. at 183 (citation omitted). Raymond v. Hodgson, 161 Mass. 184 (1894)(burden on plaintiff seeking statutory damages for dog bite sustained in breaking up fight between his and defendant's dogs to show that he exercised due care).

The Court dealt with several appeals arising out of clashes between the various modes of transportation of the time. Ellis v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co., 160 Mass. 341 (1894)(horse frightened by gong of streetcar throws driver of buggy; motorman's failure to recognize frightened condition of horse and to act accordingly constituted negligence); Robbins v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 161 Mass. 145 (1894)(horse frightened by noise and whistle of passing train at grade crossing throws plaintiffs from buggy; plaintiff's attempt to beat train to crossing not shown to have been a failure of due care in circumstances); Meservey v. Locke, 161 Mass. 332 (1894)(pedestrian knocked down and injured by horse attached to buggy driven on wrong side of road; no negligence per se in act of driving to left of centerline); Rand v. Syms, 162 Mass. 163 (1894)(action for personal injuries and for damages to horse and conveyance allegedly caused by defendant's negligent driving of her horse and conveyance).

The street railways and the railroads and their passengers and employees were a fertile source of appeals. Gilbert v. West End Street Railway, 160 Mass. 403 (1894)(no negligence leading to injury of alighting passenger where conductor had no notice that passenger intended to get off before starting car); Bigelow v. West End Street Railway, 161 Mass. 393 (1894)(no negligence on part of railway where alighting passenger failed to observe excavation in street, into which she fell; "A passenger . . . has no right to expect that the street between the track and the sidewalk shall be in such a condition that he can safely pass over it. When he leaves the car he ceases to be a passenger, and becomes merely a traveler upon the highway); Bradford v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 160 Mass. 392 (1894)(woman at station to obtain a timetable while on platform struck by mailbag thrown from train; per Field, C.J: Plaintiff "perhaps had a right to presume that, if this platform was a passageway intended to be used by passengers and other persons in going to and from the station, the company would take care that missiles should not be thrown upon it from passing trains . . . ."); Bliss v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River Railroad Co., 160 Mass. 447 (1894)(tort for personal injuries and damage to trousers and hat occasioned by train derailment); Buckley v. Old Colony Railroad Co., 161 Mass. 26 (1894)(where passenger alighted from train stopped a short distance from station because it was quicker to walk home than to wait for train to reach station and was struck and killed by express train, railroad not liable because "he thereby terminated his relation . . . as a passenger and [the railroad was under no obligation to afford him a safe path on his further progress."); Webster v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 161 Mass. 298 (1894)(although having purchased a ticket, one struck and killed by an outbound train while running across the railroad's premises, "without precautions for his safety," to catch the inbound train is not a "passenger": "The law will not imply a contract . . . to assume responsibilities for one as a passenger from such facts as appear in this case."); Felt v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 161 Mass. 311 (1894)(railroad not liable for death of brakeman run over by train "where cause and manner of accident are wholly matters of conjecture."); Thain v. Old Colony Railroad Co., 161 Mass. 353 (1894)(defendant's engineer could not recover for injuries incurred by striking post erected next to the tracks;per Holmes, J.: "A company is not bound to give warning of every such structure to every person employed upon its trains. There must be some point within the limit which it is possible for a man on a train to reach at which the railroad company has a right to build without notice and to assume that those on the trains will keep out of the way."); Buckley v. Old Colony Railroad Co., 161 Mass. 26 (1894); Cazneau v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 161 Mass. 355 (1894); Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 162 Mass. 66 (1894)(off-duty employee was "passenger" at time train on which he was riding was struck by an engine of his employer's railroad and estate could sue for wrongful death); Goodes v. Boston & Albany Railroad Co., 162 Mass. 287 (1894)(no liability for death of brakeman from striking a switch-stand placed close to tracks: "One entering the employment of another assumes the obvious risks arising from the nature of the employment, from the manner in which the business is carried on, and from the condition of the ways, works, and machinery . . . ."); Bowers v. Connecticut River Railroad Co., 162 Mass. 312 (1894)(injured brakeman entitled to new trial where: "We cannot say that the plaintiff clearly appears to have brought the accident upon himself by his own carelessness, or that he must be held to have assumed the risk . . . ."); Brady v. Old Colony Railroad Co., 162 Mass. 408 (1894)(no liability for wrongful death where obviously ill passenger, unknown to crew, alighted from train at watering stop and apparently was struck by train).

The infrastructure for the dawning electric and telephone age was creating opportunities for suits, principally by linemen wandering into the uninsulated lines of electric power companies. Hector v. Boston Electric Light Co., 161 Mass. 558 (1894)(telephone lineman); Illingsworth v. Boston Electric Light Co., 161 Mass. 583 (1894)(fire alarm lineman).

Seven years earlier, the Legislature had passed an Employers' Liability Act, 1887 Mass. Acts, c. 270, intended to create a legal remedy for the conscientious and careful workman in the event of an accident. Although the Act provided for compensation not to exceed $4,000 in cases of injury and $5,000 in cases of death (1), as construed by the Court it did little to enlarge employers' exposure. "Underlying the . . . cases and explicit in most was the assumption of the common law that an employee knew the risks when he accepted a job and should exercise due care . . . ."[2] This is illustrated in a number of 1894 cases.

In February, the Court rendered its only opinion to the House or Senate for the year. Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 160 Mass. 586 (1894), considered three questions concerning the constitutionality of a proposed act granting to women the right to vote in city and town elections.[3] Walbridge A. Field, Chief Justice, and Justices Charles Allen, James M. Morton, and John Lathrop answered all three questions in the negative. Justices Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr. [4] and James M. Barker thought the act would be constitutional in all respects, while Justice Marcus P. Knowlton answered the second question in the affirmative and the first and third in the negative.

Footnotes

[1]Equivalent to approximately $74,000 and $92,500 in 2000 inflation-adjusted dollars.

[2]LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 299 (1991).

[3]The questions were:
1. Is it constitutional, in an act granting to women the right to vote in city and town elections, to provide that such act shall take effect throughout the Commonwealth upon its acceptance by a majority vote of the voters of the whole Commonwealth?
2. Is it constitutional to provide in such an act that it shall take effect in a city or town upon its acceptance by a majority vote of the voters of such city or town?
3. Is it constitutional, in an act granting to women the right to vote in town and city elections, to provide that such an act shall take effect throughout the Commonwealth upon its acceptance by a majority vote of the voters of the whole Commonwealth, including women specially authorized to register and vote on this question alone?

[4]Noting that "the understanding always has been that questions like the present are addressed to us as individuals and require an individual answer." 160 Mass. at 593.